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ARTICLES
RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN:
REGULATIONS, REVIEW BOARDS AND REFORM
RUPALI GANDHI, J.D., M.D. *
INTRODUCTION
Historical Perspectives: Past to Present
Children have been the victims of unethical clinical investigations since the
earliest research trials.' In 1789, Edward Jenner, an English researcher trying to
discover a vaccination for smallpox, initially injected his own one-year-old son
with cowpox to determine whether it would offer protection against smallpox.
2
Then, he gave an eight-year-old child an inoculation of smallpox material to see if
a prior vaccination would be effective. Later, in 1802, a physician for an
almshouse gave the vaccine to forty-eight children who were under his care and
later challenged their immunity by inoculating the children with smallpox.4
Although these initial vaccination trials posed obvious danger to the children who
were used, they were rationalized by arguing that the possible benefits to the group
outweighed the risks to the few children who were the initial subjects.
Although research on children continued, there were at least some physicians
who objected to the use of children in medical experiments in which subjects were
purposely injured in order to obtain scientific evidence for a disease course. In
1941, the editor of the Journal of Experimental Medicine, Francis Payton Rous,
wrote in his rejection of a manuscript that "the inoculation of a twelve month old
infant with herpes ... was an abuse of power, an infringement on the rights of the
individual, and not excusable because the illness which followed had implications
* Pediatric resident, Boston Children's Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts; M.D. from Yale Medical
School, 2004; J.D. from Yale Law School, 2000.
1. Leonard H. Glantz, Research With Children, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 213, 215 (1998). See also
Susan E. Lederer & Michael A. Grodin, Historical Overview: Pediatric Experimentation, in CHILDREN
As RESEARCH SUBJECTS: SCIENCE, ETHICS AND LAW 3 (Michael A. Grodin & Leonard H. Glantz eds.,
1994).
2. Lederer & Grodin, supra note 1, at 4-5.
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id.
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for science."5 His opinion, however, had little impact on the academic community
and the research results were published in the Journal of Pediatrics.6
From the 1950s through the 1970s, a set of experiments were conducted at
the Willowbrook State School, a New York State institution for mentally disabled
children.7 The research was intended to help elucidate the natural course of
hepatitis.8 Researchers systematically infected mentally disabled children with a
hepatitis virus.9 Early subjects were given extracts of stool from infected persons,
and later subjects were injected with purified virus preparations.' 0 The researchers
justified their actions by claiming that 85% of the children in the institution would
contract the disease in the first year of admission anyway, and systematic infection
would allow the investigators to study the natural course of the disease." The
institution was closed to new children because of its overcrowded conditions, but
the hepatitis program, with its own space in the building, was able to admit new
members.'" Therefore, in order to have a child accepted to Willowbrook, parents
often had to accept their child's participation in the hepatitis program.' 3 When the
Willowbrook experiments were brought to public attention in the 1970s there was
a huge outcry. 14  It was unimaginable to the public that innocent children had
intentionally been given a serious illness and that parents, desperate to find care
for their disabled children, had been coerced into permitting their participation.
Furthermore, the researchers' justification that the children would have likely
contracted hepatitis regardless of the intentional exposure only emphasized the
terribly unsanitary conditions in which these mentally disabled children were
housed. Finally, the legal authority of parents to volunteer their children for this
research was questioned.'5
5. Id. at 14.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 17.
8. Id.; ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 70 (2d ed. 1986).
9. Lederer & Grodin, supra note 1, at 17.
10. LEVINE, supra note 8, at 70.
11. Id.
12. Id
13. Id.
14. Some results from the Willowbrook studies had been published in the New England Journal of
Medicine in 1958 with few, if any, objections, but after the public took notice in the 1970s, "a furor
attends the appearance of any Willowbrook report, even though the report may present no more than the
results of continued surveillance of children infected at an earlier date." F. J. Ingelfinger, Ethics of
Experiments on Children, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED. 791 (1973).
15. E.g., Glantz, supra note 1, at 217. But see Ingelfinger, supra note 14, at 792. Ingelfinger notes
that even after the public outcry some researchers believed that the risks imposed on the children were
permissible given the risks of being a patient in the unsanitary conditions of Willowbrook. He states
that perhaps "some broadly based system can be set up to determine under what conditions children or
mentally incompetent persons can be used for experimentation not primarily designed for their benefit.
This is the only reasonable way; it is also the only honest way." Id.
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As these examples demonstrate, children have not been adequately
protected from unethical clinical research. It is not enough to believe that
researchers will conduct their work with adequate protection for children on their
own accord. Eliot Freidson writes that the professional privilege of self-regulation
has been justified on several grounds, including that the profession "may be trusted
to undertake the proper regulatory action on those rare occasions when an
individual does not perform his work competently or ethically."' 16 Freidson is
skeptical, however, that self-regulation works in medicine because the ability to
observe performance is a prerequisite for regulation, and he doubts that the
structure of the medical profession has an appropriate level of observation. 7
Furthermore, he asserts that medical norms seem to discourage self-regulation.'
8
Talcott Parsons, by contrast, argues that professions are limited from perfect
efficiency due to social constraints.' 9  The profession's ability to function
appropriately depends on an institutional structure, "the maintenance of which...
involves a complex balance of diverse social forces. 'z  Certainly, institutional
review boards (IRBs) are a form of self-regulation by the medical community to
ensure that investigators engaged in research protect the rights and welfare of
human subjects. Although many would assert that they do an admirable job,
several IRBs have been accused of failing to protect human subjects adequately. 21
Perhaps it is not that self-regulation is impossible or undesirable, but rather that the
institutional structure of the regulatory system needs to be recalibrated.
Unfortunately, examples of unethical research involving children are not
limited to the distant past. The truth remains that even with protections that were
adopted into law in the early 1980s, there remain incidents where children have
been the subjects of research deemed unethical. The existence of federal
regulations does not guarantee that there will be compliance with the spirit
underlying the words of the regulations or complete agreement over what
constitutes ethically acceptable research. The current system relies heavily on
IRBs to function appropriately and interpret the federal regulations with careful
deliberation. Case examples, however, demonstrate that reasonable people can and
do disagree over how the regulations should be interpreted and what types of
16. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED
KNOWLEDGE 137 (2d ed. 1970).
17. Id. at 156-57.
18. Id. at 184.
19. TALCOTT PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34-35 (Free Press rev. ed. 1954)
(1949).
20. Id. at 48.
21. One might argue, however, that inherent uncertainties in medical practice, knowledge, and
research would lead to less than perfect outcomes even iflRBs functioned flawlessly. See JAY KATZ,
THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 171 (1984) (arguing that the challenge for IRBs is to be
aware of, and willing to accept, uncertainty); See also LEVINE supra note 8, at 127-128 (stating that
physicians fear acknowledging uncertainty).
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research protocols are ethically permissible. Most recently, a study of housing lead
abatement conducted by affiliates of Johns Hopkins University engendered
differing opinions over what should be ethically acceptable. 22 Additionally, a
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) study using
obese children and children of obese parents was terminated for violating the
federal regulations. 23 This article will explain the special problems of involving
children in research, provide a thorough understanding of some of the past and
current protections for human clinical research participants (including the current
federal regulations), emphasize the more controversial areas, and make
recommendations on how the regulatory structure could be improved.
Part I describes why children are unique in the research world. It argues that
while children are vulnerable and require additional protections when participating
in research, they should not be excluded from research altogether because this is
more detrimental to their well-being than permitting their participation. Rather,
children should be permitted to participate in research but with additional
safeguards in place that protect their vulnerability.
Part I1 describes the historical context of human research protections
including the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki. It explores the
ethical principles that have been used to protect humans involved in clinical
research and explains how these principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and
justice are applied to persons with diminished capacity, such as children. The
unique characteristics of children make the application of these principles less
straightforward than when applied to research involving adults, and these
principles' expression in procedural and substantive norms is necessarily altered
when applied to children.
The current federal regulations that govern human clinical trials involving
children are scrutinized in Part III. The regulations were passed in the early 1980s,
but were preceded by recommendations made by a national commission that was
created several years earlier in the aftermath of the Tuskegee syphilis experiments.
Although the regulations were a vast improvement over prior codes, they continue
to use an array of vague language that leaves substantial room for debate in their
interpretation. Several hypothetical cases and recent controversial cases will be
used to exemplify how reasonable people continue to disagree over how the
regulations should be interpreted and applied.
Finally, Part IV offers recommendations for change within the regulatory
system. The creation of a hierarchical review board system that maintains the local
IRBs but creates many regional boards and one national board analogous to the
federal court structure will have a positive impact on the current regulatory system.
The establishment of a more centralized system that still maintains a degree of
22. See infra notes 103-123 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
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flexibility will divide the duties among the review boards according to their
strengths, encourage greater consistency among interpreters of the regulations,
provide an appeals process for individual investigators, and create one national
board with the requisite case experience and knowledge of how the regional and
local review boards operate to enable it to promulgate memoranda that clarify the
interpretation of the federal regulations as needed.
PART I: CHILDREN IN RESEARCH
Children are distinct from other human research subjects because they do not
usually have the maturity and knowledge base to make an informed decision.24
They are "incapacitated" in the sense that one would not expect a five-year-old
child to be able to comprehend, process, engage in abstract reasoning, or
synthesize information in the same way as a twenty-five-year-old person.
Children cannot be expected to make fully-informed decisions regarding their own
participation in clinical trials that may or may not directly benefit them. Surely,
some children will express opinions, but children can often be guided into making
a decision based on the viewpoint of a parent or trusted adult. In order to ensure
that a child truly understands what is being asked of him and is not being coerced
or improperly informed, special protections or cautions must be used when
children are research subjects.
Given the multiple examples where children have been mistreated in
clinical research trials, one might argue that children should not be permitted to
participate in human investigations at all. This approach, seemingly radical in the
modem world, was indirectly supported by the Nuremberg Code.25 Despite the
desire to protect children from the possible harms that can result from their
participation in research, far more detrimental effects would occur if children were
prohibited from participation in human clinical investigations altogether.
If research involving children (or any group having biological differences
from the "average" such as pregnant women) were disallowed, the medical
progress for that population would be halted as well. Diseases such as cystic
fibrosis, phenylketonuria, and Hirschprung's disease and many congenital
anomalies first manifest in childhood. If they are not treated early, the child may
not ever reach adulthood.26 In order to make advances in the treatment of these
24. See LEVINE, supra note 8, at 238-39.
25. Although the Nuremberg Code was silent with regard to children, it required legal capacity to
give consent for participation, and therefore, indirectly prevented children (who cannot legally consent)
from participation. See infra Appendix 2 for text of the Nuremberg Code.
26. For more information, see MEDLINE PLUS, MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/0000l7.htm (last visited June 28, 2005); NAT'L
DIGESTIVE DISEASES INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE, WHAT I NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
HIRSCHSPRUNG'S DISEASE, http://digestive.niddk.nih.gov/ddiseases/pubs/hirschsprungs ez/ (last visited
June 28, 2005).
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diseases, a research study needs to enroll children who have the diseases in
question. Without such research, the children become "therapeutic orphans. 27
They are left behind while medicine advances for everyone else.
Furthermore, beyond research on childhood diseases, there is another
category of essential research - medication use in children - that lags far behind.
Presently, most medications used for children are used "off-label," meaning that
they were never formally tested on children; rather, the adult doses are modified
and then given to the child. Since 1962, the FDA has required nearly all new drugs
to be labeled with an "orphaning" clause such as "not recommended for use in
infants and young children, since few studies have been carried out in this age
group . ,28 Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of physicians ignore the
orphaning clause on the labels and use the medications for children, albeit usually
at an adjusted dose. The result of off-label usage is that it produces a greater risk
to the child than if the child had been part of a well-designed research protocol that
tested different medication doses to determine the appropriate level to be used. A
child in a research study designed to test the best dose of a medication would likely
have more information about the medication, frequent surveillance of side effects,
and a greater likelihood of having access to medical care should an adverse
reaction develop. Children given a medication off-label, however, do not have the
same surveillance of side effects and risk a greater possibility of harm if an adverse
reaction occurs in an uncontrolled, unmonitored setting. Robert Levine argues that
the therapeutic orphan problem is a serious injustice for children. He observes that
"[i]f we consider the availability of drugs proved safe and effective through the
devices of modem clinical pharmacology and clinical trials a benefit, then it is
unjust to deprive classes of persons, e.g., children ... of this benefit., 29
The problem with the lack of clinical pharmacology studies in children is
even more concerning than the dearth of studies involving other vulnerable groups
(such as prisoners or mentally disabled individuals) because children often have
smaller body sizes, different physiology, and different metabolisms (for example,
the newborn liver does not metabolize certain medications as efficiently as the
adult liver). Therefore, improper medication doses for children could lead to grave
consequences more often than with adults. Logically then, it appears that
medications used in children should have more stringent testing than medications
27. Harry Shirkey, Editorial Comment: Therapeutic Orphans, 72 J. PEDIATRICS 119 (1968);
LEVINE, supra note 8, at 239-41.
28. Shirkey, supra note 27, at 119.
29. LEVINE, supra note 8, at 240. Levine continues, "Parenthetically, it should be noted that most
drugs proved safe and effective in adults do not produce unexpected adverse reactions in children;
however, when they do, the numbers of harmed children tend to be much higher than they would be if
the drugs had been studied systematically before they were introduced into the practice of medicine."
Id. at 240-41.
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used for adults. Yet the opposite is true: medications used for children have the
least amount of empirical evidence supporting their use.
The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 200230 gives financial
incentives to pharmaceutical companies that voluntarily decide to test their
medications in children, but this law clearly has not done enough considering that
as of July 2003, three-fourths of all prescription medications on the market had
inadequate information regarding their safety in pediatric populations.3' In 1998,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) attempted to alleviate the problem by
adopting a regulation known as the Pediatric Rule.32  The Rule required
pharmaceutical companies to test specific medicines in children before the drugs
were marketed.33 In October 2002, however, a judge ruled that the FDA did not
have the authority to adopt the Pediatric Rule and struck it down. 34 Congress
reacted, albeit slowly, and adopted the Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, 35
which was signed into law in December 2003.36 The law gives the FDA
jurisdiction to require that drugs used in pediatric patients be appropriately tested
with pediatric populations prior to FDA approval.37 Recognizing the importance
of solving the therapeutic orphan problem, FDA Commissioner Mark McClellan
stated:
Prescription drugs can do more than ever to cure diseases, including
illnesses in children. But it is not good medicine to assume that children
can be treated like little adults. Parents and health professionals deserve
confidence that medicines used to treat children are safe and effective.
FDA will use this important new law to require pediatric studies, when
necessary, to give parents and doctors the confidence they deserve.35
Undoubtedly, the Pediatric Research Equity Act is a step in the right direction
towards alleviating the therapeutic orphan problem and decreasing off-label
medication use and its associated risks. The law will lead to increased numbers of
research trials involving children, and although these studies should be conducted
30. Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002).
31. David J. Schonfeld, Participation and Protection of Children in Clinical Research, Statement
Before the Institute of Medicine Committee on Clinical Research Involving Children (July 9, 2003),
http://www.aap.org/advocacy/washing/DavidSchonfeld testimony.htm (last visited June 28, 2005).
32. Regulations Requiring Manufacturers to Assess the Safety and Effectiveness of New Drugs
and Biological Products in Pediatric Patients, 63 Fed. Reg. 66, 632 (Dec. 2, 1998) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 201, 312, 314, & 601).
33. Id.
34. Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 222 (D.D.C. 2002).
35. Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936 (2003) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 & 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 262 & 284m (West Supp. 2004)).
36. Id.
37. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355c (West Supp. 2004).
38. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Statement of FDA Commissioner Mark B.
McClellan, M.D., Ph.D., on the Signing of the Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003 (Dec. 3, 2003),
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00989.html (last visited June 28, 2005).
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to benefit children, additional safeguards must be in place to prevent their
manipulation and exposure to unreasonable levels of possible harm. The balance
between encouraging research designed to help children as a group and preventing
unreasonably high levels of risk to any particular child in a study is difficult to
strike. Ethical principles can serve an important role by guiding decision-makers
during difficult assessments.
PART II: FOUNDATIONS OF RESEARCH ETHICS
A. Early Codes of Research Ethics
From 1945-1947, the first international warcrimes trials were held in
Nuremberg, Germany in order to bring to justice the Nazis who committed terrible
offenses during World War II. Many of the crimes included horrific murders and
tortures conducted in the name of medical research. The three Nuremberg judges
were infuriated by the atrocities, which had used science as a justification and
decided to codify fundamental ethical guidelines for permissible human research
"in order to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts. '39 The Nuremberg Military
Tribunal's decision in United States v. Karl Brandt4 ° included a ten-point
statement that described permissible medical experiments on human subjects.4'
These ten principles became known as the Nuremberg Code, which is generally
regarded as the first international document to set out ethical regulations for human
experimentation based on informed consent.42 (See Table 1.)
TABLE 1: INFLUENTIAL DOCUMENTS ON RESEARCH ETHICS
43
YEAR PUBLICATION AUTHOR DESCRIPTION
1947 Nuremberg Nuremberg judges First major international
Code code of research conduct
created after Nuremberg
trials of Nazi
physicians/researchers
39. See infra Appendix 2, at 317-18 for text of Nuremberg Code.
40. See infra Appendix 2, at 317-18 for text of Nuremberg Code.
41. See infra Appendix 2, at 317-18 for text of Nuremberg Code.
42. Finnuala Kelleher, The Pharmaceutical Industry's Responsibility for Protecting Human
Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 67, 72 (2004); Julie
Rothstein Rosenbaum, Educating Researchers: Ethics and the Protection of Human Research
Participants, 31 CRITICAL CARE MED. S161, S162 (2003). The Nuremberg Code, however, was not the
first document to outline the obligations of researchers conducting human clinical investigations. In
fact, federal law in Germany already included such obligations and prohibitions against unethical
research, but these laws were ignored during the Third Reich. LEVINE, supra note 8, at 69.
43. Rosenbaum, supra note 42, at S 162.
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1964 Declaration World Medical Comprehensive ethical
of Helsinki Association guidelines for physicians
involved with research,
last updated in 2000
1979 Belmont The National Commission Report that identified key
Report for the Protection of principles for guiding
Human Subjects of human research
Biomedical and protection, including
Behavioral Research from respect for persons,
the Department of Health, beneficence, justice
Education, and Welfare
The first principle of the Nuremberg Code states: "The voluntary consent of
the human subject is absolutely essential." 4  The term "voluntary" is further
elaborated:
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of
choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit,
duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion;
and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the
elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an
understanding and enlightened decision.45
This principle, although well intentioned, is extremely overbroad because,
taken literally, it would prohibit all research involving those who are unable to
consent, including children and the mentally disabled. The Code makes no
exceptions for proxy consent or consent for minors to be given by parents.
Investigators, therefore, have largely ignored this principle of the Nuremberg Code
and continue to conduct research using these populations. Even though the authors
may be admired for attempting to codify basic ethical principles, the overall impact
of the Nuremberg Code on actual research practices has been minimal. One
scholar points out that "the very circumstances that gave the code its high moral
standing - the horrors that surrounded its origins - partly account for its relative
lack of influence in the postwar years: ordinary researchers found it hard to believe
that the code need be applied to their own work.
' 46
44. See infra Appendix 2, at 317-18 for text of Nuremberg Code.
45. Id.
46. Kendall Ann Desaulniers, Comment, Legislation to Protect the Decisionally Incapacitated
Individual's Participation in Medical Research: Safety Net or Trap Door?, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 179,
182 (2000) (quoting Jonathan D. Moreno, The Dilemmas of Experimenting on People, TECH. REV.,
July 1997, http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/97/07/moreno0797.asp?p=l
(last visited June 28, 2005)).
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In response to the overly restrictive Nuremberg Code, the World Medical
Association adopted the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964.47 The Declaration also
emphasizes the importance of freely given informed consent by research subjects,
but it parts with the Nuremberg Code in an important way:
In case of legal incompetence, informed consent should be obtained
from the legal guardian in accordance with national legislation. Where
physical or mental incapacity makes it impossible to obtain informed
consent, or when the subject is a minor, permission from the responsible
relative replaces that of the subject in accordance with national
legislation.48
The Declaration of Helsinki implicitly acknowledges that research on groups
who are unable to give consent is necessary to advance medical care for them and
provides a method for obtaining proxy consent. It serves as a more practical guide
to researchers and tries to alleviate the problem of the therapeutic orphan.
Nevertheless, even after the Declaration of Helsinki was written, pediatric research
was rare in the United States because the legal status of proxy consent remained
uncertain.
Another important feature of the Declaration of Helsinki was its division of
research into therapeutic and non-therapeutic categories. The 1975 revised
Declaration divides research into "Medical Research Combined with Professional
Care (Clinical Research)" and "Nontherapeutic Biomedical Research Involving
Human Subjects (Nonclinical Biomedical Research)., 49 For the first category of
research (therapeutic research), physicians can perform research "only to the extent
that medical research is justified by its potential diagnostic or therapeutic value for
the patient."50 In the non-therapeutic category, however, subjects must be "healthy
persons or patients for whom the experimental design is not related to the patient's
illness."'" The distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research has
the unfortunate consequence of prohibiting all placebo-controlled studies because
the placebo arm is not of therapeutic value to the patient, and using healthy control
52subjects for the placebo arm of a trial would yield no useful information. Levine
explains that the distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research
essentially prohibits all research in pathogenesis, pathophysiology, and
epidemiology because these types of studies usually do not have therapeutic value
47. Human Experimentation: Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association, 2 BRIT. MED. J.
177 (1964); Declaration of Helsinki (1975), reprinted in LEVINE, supra note 8, 427-29. The
Declaration of Helsinki has been revised several times, most recently in 2000. See infra Appendix 3 for
full text.
48. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 47, at 428.
49. Id., at 429.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. LEVINE, supra note 8, at 9.
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for the research subjects.53 Levine further argues that every clinical trial has
components that are not therapeutic, but that to classify an entire protocol as
therapeutic just because of one therapeutic component results in the "fallacy of the
package deal., 54  Non-therapeutic components of a protocol are commonly
justified because the protocol includes one or more therapeutic components.
Levine provides some examples:
Such erroneous justifications in the recent past have been frequent. In
trials of thrombolytic therapy, repeated coronary angiograms have been
performed on patients who had clinical indications for only one. Liver
biopsies have been performed for no reason other than to disguise
treatment assignments in a double-blind placebo-controlled trial.
Repeated endoscopies have been performed in a population of patients
with peptic ulcers who had clinical indications for no more than one.
Placebos have been administered by way of a catheter inserted in the
coronary artery. I do not want to be misunderstood as saying that any of
these procedures were unethical. I am simply arguing that they should
not be justified according to standards developed for "therapeutic
research. 55
The Declaration of Helsinki was most recently revised in October 2000.56
Despite some changes adopted in this sixth version, the Declaration remains
restrictive of placebo trials. In addition, although it removed the words
"therapeutic" and "non-therapeutic," it still uses the distinction to determine what
research is permissible.57
Although they were important advances in the conceptual framework for
ethical research, the Nuremberg Code (1947) and the Declaration of Helsinki
(1964) were never legally binding documents. As a result, these ethical codes did
not halt existing research abuses such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the
Willowbrook School study on children.58  The ethical canons of Nuremberg and
Helsinki were not powerful enough to stop the egregious devaluing of human life
53. Id.; Robert J. Levine, International Codes of Research Ethics: Current Controversies and the
Future, 35 IND. L. REV. 557, 559-60 (2002); Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 47, at 429.
54. Levine, supra note 53, at 560.
55. Id.
56. World Medical Ass'n Declaration of Helsinki, Doc. 17C (Oct. 2000), http://www.wma.net/
e/ethicsunit/helsinki.htm (last visited June 26, 2005).
57. Levine, supra note 56, at 559.
58. The Tuskegee Syphilis experiment began in 1932 and was designed to measure the results of
untreated syphilis in black males who were uneducated sharecroppers. The protocol in this trial
included a placebo arm where subjects were given aspirin instead of proven treatments for syphilis.
Furthermore, the researchers did not stop the trial and give subjects penicillin when it was discovered in
the 1940s. The study did not receive press attention until 1972. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., THE NAT'L CTR. FOR HIV, STD, AND TB PREVENTION, THE TUSKEGEE TIMELINE, at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/tuskegee/time.htm (last visited June 28, 2005). See supra notes 7-15 and
accompanying text for discussion of the Willowbrook studies.
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that these research studies exemplified. In the aftermath of these studies, a modern
code that was legally binding was needed to govern research ethics and renew the
public's trust in medical research.
B. The National Commission and Ethical Principles
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) published its
first proposed regulations on protection of human subjects in 1973. When the
atrocities of the Tuskegee experiments came to light, Congress held national
hearings on human clinical research, and adopted the National Research Act of
1974, 59 which created the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research [hereinafter "Commission"]. 60
The Commission was to develop guidelines for ethical research involving human
subjects and make recommendations to the DHEW Secretary for the application of
these guidelines.i Section 202(a)(1)(A) of the National Research Act specified
that the Commission should:
(i) conduct a comprehensive investigation and study to identify the
basic ethical principles which should underlie the conduct of
biomedical and behavioral research involving human subjects,
(ii) develop guidelines which should be followed in such research to
assure that it is conducted in accordance with such principles, and
(iii) make recommendations to the Secretary (I) for such administrative
actions as may be appropriate to apply such guidelines to biomedical
and behavioral research conducted or supported under programs
administered by the Secretary .... 62
The Commission published reports on human subject research from 1975 to
1978 and presented the reports as recommendations to the DHEW Secretary as
instructed.63 The Commission addressed topics such as IRBs, research on the fetus
and embryo, and research involving children. The Commission was disbanded in
59. Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974) (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2891-1 nt. (1976)),
omitted by Health Research Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-158, 99 Stat. 820, 873-86 (1985).
60. Nat'l Research Act, 88 Stat. 348 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2891-1 nt. (1976)), omitted
by Health Research Extension Act of 1985, 99 Stat. 873-86 (1985).
61. Dept. of Health, Educ., and Welfare, Office of the Sec'y, Research Involving Children: Report
and Recommendations of the Nat'l Comm'n for the Prot. of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, 43 Fed. Reg. 2084, 2084 (Jan. 13, 1978) [hereinafter Report on Research
Involving Children].
62. National Research Act § 202(a)(l)(A), 88 Stat. at 349 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2891-1 nt.,
omitted by Health Research Extension Act of 1985, 99 Stat. at 873-86); LEVINE, supra note 8, at xi-xii.
63. Importantly, the Commission explicitly repudiated the use of therapeutic and non-therapeutic
categories of research after using the distinction in its first report on research involving fetuses.
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1978,64 but during its brief years of existence it made valuable contributions to
discussions on research ethics and suggested possible regulatory guidelines.
The Commission's "Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for
the Protection of Human Subjects Research" (1979) described three ethical
principles that should guide research involving human subjects: respect for
persons, beneficence, and justice. The first of these, respect for persons, requires
that individuals be treated as "autonomous agents" and also that "persons with
diminished autonomy [and thus in need of protection] are entitled to such
protection., 65  To treat a person as an "autonomous agent" requires that the
individual be left to make his or her own decisions, even if doing so may result in
66harm to that person, unless he or she consents to receive help or to participate.
Furthermore, a person's actions should not be hindered unless they are clearly
detrimental to others.67 Certainly, not every person has the ability to act as an
"autonomous agent," and it is this subset of people that require additional
protections because without them, they are far more likely to have their person
disrespected. 68  Because research involving children involves persons with
diminished autonomy, children deserve extra protections when they participate in
such research.
The second ethical principle, beneficence, means that the researcher should
maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms.69 It is important to
recognize that this principle is more than simple non-maleficence; it also imposes a
positive duty on the researcher to maximize benefits and minimize harms. The
Belmont Report recognizes that this is not always a simple task and that
researchers will need "to decide when it is justifiable to seek certain benefits
despite the risks involved, and when the benefits should be foregone because of the
64. LEVINE, supra note 8, at xii.
65. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH pt. B.1 (1979) [hereinafter
BELMONT REPORT], http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.htm (last visited June
28, 2005).
66. LEVINE, supra note 8, at 15.
67. Id. at 16.
68. Id. Levine argues:
The capacity for self-determination matures during a person's life; some lose this
capacity partially or completely owing to illness or mental disability or in situations
that severely restrict liberty, such as prisons. Respect for the immature or the
incapacitated may require one to offer protection to them as they mature or while
they are incapacitated.
Id.
69. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 65, at pt. B.2.
[VOL. 8:2:264
RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN
risks., 70 The Belmont Report allows the benefit to society to be considered in the
equation when balancing risks and potential benefits involved. 71
Justice, the third basic principle, requires that subjects are chosen and treated
fairly. Justice is essential to "insure that certain individuals or classes of
individuals - such as prisoners, elderly people, or financially impoverished people
- are not systematically selected or excluded, unless there are scientifically or
ethically valid reasons for doing so. ' '72 This concept of justice is meant to provide
an equal distribution of the benefits and burdens that accompany research. The
Commission did not interpret justice in a utilitarian way to mean the greatest good
for the greatest number of people because this view ignores the idea that fairness
requires extra protections for vulnerable groups.73 The Commission concluded:
[P]ersons having limited capacity to consent are vulnerable or
disadvantaged in ways that are morally relevant to their involvement as
subjects of research. Therefore, the principle of justice is interpreted as
requiring that we facilitate activities that are designed to yield direct
74benefit to the subjects ....
These three principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice have
provided the ethical framework for human clinical research, and as noted by the
Commission, these principles require additional safety measures to protect
vulnerable populations involved in research. The Commission's reports and
suggestions, which were later revised and adopted into the Code of Federal
Regulations,75 rely heavily on the ethical principles.
In 1980, DHEW was restructured; education became a separate department,
and what remained of DHEW became the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS). 76  Shortly thereafter, in 1981, DHHS published federal
regulations on the protection of human subjects that were mostly an adoption of
the Commission's suggestions. These initial federal regulations did not include
70. Id.
71. Id. at pts. B2, C2; Desaulniers, supra note 46, at 202-03. Cf Declaration of Helsinki, § 111 (4),
supra note 47, at 429 ("In research on man, the interest of science and society should never take
precedence over considerations related to the well-being of the subject.").
72. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH (NIH), ORIENTATION INFORMATION FOR MEMBERS OF
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AT THE NIH 15 (2004), http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/irb/Orientation
GudelinesFinal.pdf (last visited June 28, 2005); see also BELMONT REPORT, supra note 65, at pt. B.3.
73. LEVINE, supra note 8, at 18.
74. Id. at 236.
75. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2004). See infra Appendix 1, at 312-16 and
Appendix 4, at 323-24, for pertinent parts of this regulation.
76. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS, http://www.hhs.gov/about/
hhshist.html (last visited June 28, 2005).
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special regulations for children, but regulations for children were finally approved
two years later in 1983. 77
Although the Code of Federal Regulations attempts to provide boundaries
between acceptable and unacceptable research, there will always be research
protocols that do not fall neatly into these categories. It is precisely when the
regulations do not provide clear answers regarding the acceptability of a particular
research protocol that the three ethical principles become even more important;
they should serve as guidance when the regulations are ambiguous.
PART III: FEDERAL REGULATIONS
A. Additional Protections for Children Involved as Subjects in Research:
The Commission's report, "Research Involving Children" (1977), made
recommendations that allow children to be used in research yet still protects them
adequately from harm. The recommendations served as the basis for the Code of
Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) Subpart D: Additional Protections for Children
Involved as Subjects in Research (1983). Unlike the Nuremberg Code and the
Declaration of Helsinki, the regulations are legally binding; however, they are not
without their flaws. The main purpose of Subpart D is to provide children, as
members of a population considered vulnerable, with additional safeguards. The
section divides research involving children into four categories, each of which has
different requirements for approval. (See Table 2.) Section 46.403 further requires
that IRBs only approve research that satisfies the requirements set forth in the
remainder of Subpart D.78
TABLE 2: FEDERAL REGULATIONS FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN7 9
FEDERAL RISK POSED BY THE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
REGULATION INTERVENTION OR PROTOCOL APPROVAL
SECTION PROCEDURE (*All require IRB approval,
child's assent 8° and permission by
parent or guardian 81)
77. Additional Prots. for Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 48 Fed. Reg. 9,818 (Mar. 8,
1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
78. IRB Duties, 45 C.F.R. §46.403 (2004), infra at 312.
79. Id. §§ 46.404 - 46.409, infra at 313-19; see also Jeffrey P. Bums, Research in Children, 31
CRITICAL CARE MED. S131, S134 (2003).
80. Id. § 46.408, infra at 315-18. The regulations state:
In addition to the determinations required under other applicable sections of this
subpart, the IRB shall determine that adequate provisions are made for soliciting
the assent of the children, when in the judgment of the IRB the children are
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45 C.F.R. § 46.404 No greater than No additional requirements
minimal risk
45 C.F.R. § 46.405 Greater than Risk is justified by the anticipated
minimal risk with benefit to each subject
prospect of direct Anticipated benefit to each subject
benefit to subject is at least as favorable as that
presented by available alternative
approaches
45 C.F.R. § 46.406 Greater than Risk represents a minor increase
minimal risk with no over minimal risk
prospect of direct Intervention or procedure presents
benefit to subject experiences to the child that are
reasonably commensurate with
those in the child's actual or
expected medical, dental,
psychological, social or
educational situations
The study is likely to yield
generalizable knowledge about the
child's disorder or condition that
is of vital importance for the
understanding or amelioration of
the disorder or condition
45 C.F.R. §46.407 Research not IRB finds that the research
otherwise presents a reasonable opportunity
approvable to further the understanding,
prevention, or alleviation of a
serious problem affecting the
health or welfare of children
Approval of the Secretary of
DHHS after consultation with a
capable of providing assent. In determining whether children are capable of
assenting, the IRB shall take into account the ages, maturity, and psychological
state of the children involved.
Id. § 46.408(a).
81. Permission from one parent or guardian is acceptable for research covered by 45 C.F.R. §§
46.404 or 46.405, but where research is covered by §§ 46.406 and 46.407, "both parents must give their
permission unless one parent is deceased, unknown, incompetent, or not reasonably available, or when
only one parent has legal responsibility for the care and custody of the child." Id. § 46.408.
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panel of experts in pertinent fields,
and following opportunity for
public review and comment
The drafters of the regulations, following the lead of the Commission,
refrained from using the distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
research and thereby avoided the "fallacy of the package deal" that is created with
the Declaration of Helsinki language and others who rely on such a distinction.82
Rather than analyzing the overall risk posed by a research protocol, the risk posed
by each individual intervention or procedure in the protocol is assessed. 3 These
risks then are weighed against possible benefits caused by those same interventions
or procedures. 84 This assessment prevents the error of justifying an extremely
risky intervention simply because it is part of a protocol deemed to have large
overall benefits. An important caveat to the risk/benefit calculation for each study
is that the benefits can only encompass the health consequences of the study's
interventions and procedures. Economic incentives such as direct payments, free
medical treatment, free medications, or diagnostic tests are not included as benefits
because using economic incentives in the risk/benefit analysis or including them as
benefits in the informed consent is viewed as starting a slippery slope toward
undue inducement.
B. Section 404: No Greater than Minimal Risk
The first category of research is that which involves interventions or
procedures that pose nothing greater than minimal risk to a research subject who
may be either a healthy child or a child with an illness. For this research, the
criteria for approval are essentially the same as those required for all human
subjects including adults or non-vulnerable populations. The only additional
requirements for a pediatric population are that the child's assent be obtained (if
possible) and that a parent or guardian give permission for the child's participation
in the study.8 5  Because the idea of "minimal risk" is subject to multiple
interpretations, the drafters of the regulations attempted to clarify the words by
defining minimal risk to mean "the probability and magnitude of harm . ..
anticipated in the [proposed] research are not greater ...than those ordinarily
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or
82. See Levine, supra note 53, at 560 and accompanying text.
83. Id.
84. Id at 560-61.
85. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.402(b) & 46.402(c) (2004), infra at 312 ("Assent means a child's affirmative
agreement to participate in research. Mere failure to object should not, absent affirmative agreement, be
construed as assent [and] Permission means the agreement of parent(s) or guardian to the participation
of their child or ward in research").
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psychological examinations or tests. 86 The idea behind the minimal risk threshold
is that it is a socially permissible level of risk to which parents would normally
permit their children to be exposed in non-research settings. The National
Commission provided some examples of interventions that easily fall within this
category: "routine immunization[s], modest changes in diet or schedule, physical
examination, obtaining blood and urine specimens, and developmental
assessments." 87 It is important to remember that for protocols that fall under this
category, it does not make any difference whether the intervention has the potential
to benefit the subject or whether the child is healthy. As long as the risk posed by
the intervention is no more than minimal, there are no additional requirements for
review and acceptability.
1. Defining Minimal Risk
There are several problems with the definition of minimal risk provided in the
Code of Federal Regulations, but many of these can be reconciled by examining
the Commission's report and the principles of respects for persons, beneficence,
and justice on which the regulations are based. First, the regulations do not
explicitly indicate whose daily life should be used as a standard; certainly not all
members of the research group are exposed to the same risks of harm in their daily
lives. For example, a child growing up in extreme poverty may encounter a daily
risk of malnourishment that is not experienced by his or her wealthier counterpart.
A child growing up in a war-tom nation or a country plagued by AIDS will
definitely encounter greater risks in daily life than a child growing up in a more
stable environment.88 Some argue that the "daily life" requirement should be
based on the average child within that population. 89  Others argue that the
acceptable risk level should be based on the daily risks encountered by healthy
children in a stable environment.90 The definition of minimal risk in the federal
regulations differs in one important respect to the definition first proposed in the
National Commission's recommendations. The Commission stated: "Minimal risk
is the probability and magnitude of physical or psychological harm that is normally
86. Id. § 46.102(i).
87. Report on Research Involving Children, supra note 61, at 2085.
88. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 79, at S 134. Bums asserts:
In particular, if one adopts a relative interpretation of minimal risk, then some
children whose daily routine exposes them to relatively higher risks in theory could
also be the subjects of research in which the risk exposure was, therefore,
proportionally higher than would be approved for a child from a more protected or
advantaged background.
Id.
89. Benjamin Freedman et. al., In Loco Parentis: Minimal Risk as an Ethical Threshold for
Research Upon Children, 23 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 17 (1993).
90. E.g., Loretta M. Kopelman, Children as Research Subjects: A Dilemma, 25 J. OF MED. & PHIL.
745, 754 (2000).
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encountered in the daily lives, or in the routine medical or psychological
examination, of healthy children."91  Although the Commission's intent was to
define the minimal risk threshold based on a healthy child, the federal regulations
are ambiguous. The Commission also provided specific examples of procedures
that it considered to be no more than minimal risk, but these specific examples
were excluded from the regulations, thereby leaving the acceptability of some of
these more common procedures to the individual judgment of the IRBs.
Although the federal regulations do not explicitly define minimal risk to be
based on the daily risks encountered by healthy children, it is clear that the
Commission's report intended it to be defined in this absolute way. Consider, for a
moment, the possibility that the daily risks in the federal regulations are interpreted
as being relative and not absolute. Certainly, there are children exposed to
abnormally high levels of risk, but to use their daily experiences as the threshold of
daily risk would unjustly subject them to higher risks than other children.92 This
type of justification for a high risk protocol is reminiscent of the Willowbrook
studies, where children who were exposed to an abnormally high risk of
contracting hepatitis were then given hepatitis because it was considered to be a
risk to which they were already exposed.93 Undoubtedly, the federal regulations
were written to prohibit this type of research, not to protect it. Therefore, daily
risks, as written in the regulations, must be interpreted as risks that a healthy child
in a stable environment encounters.
The National Human Research Protections Advisory Committee (NHRPAC)
Children's Workgroup was formed in 2000 and charged with providing advice and
recommendations on human subjects protection to the Office for Human Research
Protections (OHRP).94 NHRPAC issued a report to clarify the definitions of
"minimal risk" and "minor increase over minimal risk." In the report, NHRPAC
specifically denied that minimal risk should be a variable standard based on a
particular child's circumstances and defined minimal risk to be the level of risk
associated with the daily activities of a "normal, healthy, average child." 95
Furthermore, the report states: "Indexing the definition of minimal risk to the
91. Report on Research Involving Children, supra note 61, at 2085 (emphasis added). It is
interesting to note that the Commission offered different definitions of minimal risk in several of its
reports in an effort to express their view that the threshold should be different for different populations.
This subtly was lost when the drafters of the federal regulations provided a single definition of minimal
risk for all human subject populations. Personal Communication with Robert J. Levine, Professor of
Medicine and Lecturer in Pharmacology, Yale University School of Medicine (Jan. 2004).
92. Kopelman, supra note 90, at 754.
93. Id.
94. NAT'L HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS. ADVISORY COMM., CHILDREN'S WORKGROUP, CHILDREN'S
WORKGROUP DRAFT REPORT 1 (Apr. 5, 2001), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/nhrpac/mtg04-0l/child-
workgroup4-5-01 .pdf (last visited June 28, 2005).
95. NAT'L HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS. ADVISORY COMM., CHILDREN'S WORKGROUP, CLARIFYING
SPECIFIC PORTION OF 45 CFR 46 SUBPART D THAT GOVERNS CHILDREN'S RESEARCH 1 [hereinafter
WORKGROUP REPORT], http://ctep.cancer.gov/forms/nhrpacl6.pdf (last visited June 28, 2005).
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socially allowable risks to which normal, average children are exposed routinely
should take into account the differing risks experienced by children of different
ages., 96
Certainly, this argument is not meant to prohibit children exposed to
abnormally high risks from participating in research; it simply asserts that
subjecting them to their high baseline risks cannot be classified as minimal. The
fact that these children face abnormally high risks is not a morally relevant
distinction that justifies protecting them less when they participate in human
clinical trials. To use a relative standard for minimal risk would violate the
principle of justice for these children. They would be subject to an unequal
distribution of the burdens of research involving human participants because
riskier studies could be performed with them but not with healthier children.
The second difficulty with the definition of minimal risk is that it considers
the "probability and magnitude" of possible harm, but it does not provide a
framework with which to judge what are acceptable probabilities and magnitudes
of harm. To decide what is an appropriately low probability or magnitude of harm
is not an easy task. The evaluation requires careful balancing and normative
assessments because sometimes a low probability of substantial harm might be
approved, whereas a high likelihood of a more moderate harm may not. 9 7 Because
the federal regulations do not suggest a way to judge acceptable levels of harm, the
IRBs are left to make the decisions on their own. The federal regulations do not
offer any examples of acceptable or unacceptable harms as a reference point for the
IRBs. Perhaps local IRBs are best suited to make this assessment on a case-by-
case basis, but one might also argue that leaving too much power in the hands of
overburdened IRBs without adequate guidance is a recipe for inconsistency and a
set up for disaster.
C. Section 405: Interventions with Prospect of Direct Benefit to Subject
The second category includes procedures or interventions that have the
potential to benefit the individual subject directly. In these cases, it does not
matter if the intervention poses greater than minimal risk to the subject, and the
minimal risk evaluation is not needed in the analysis of these cases. Because this
class of interventions must have the prospect of directly benefiting the subjects, it
will generally involve a child who is not the average healthy child in a stable
environment. 98 In such cases, the research protocol has the added requirements of
96. Id.
97. Kopelman, supra note 90, at 753.
98. But cf Bruce Gordon et. al., The Use of Normal Children as Participants in Research on
Therapy, IRB: ETHICS & HUMAN RES., May-June 1996, at 5-8. This study involved using siblings of ill
children in a protocol that involved more than minimal risk procedures. The healthy siblings were
viewed as gaining a direct psychological benefit from participating in the research protocol (because
2005]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
showing that the risk posed to the subjects is justified by the anticipated benefit,
and that the anticipated benefit is at least as favorable to the subjects as that
presented by available alternatives.99
An example of a research protocol that easily falls into this category is a
study using a new chemotherapeutic agent for leukemia. The new drug may pose a
significant risk to the potential subjects, but as long as the anticipated benefits are
also high, and the expected benefits from the agent are at least as high as the
current available alternative medication, then the trial would be appropriately
approved. Importantly, any control arm of this study would need to receive the
current available alternative medication and not a placebo in order for the trial to
be approved.
Although it may be more controversial than the above example, there are
situations when determining the high level of daily risks to which some
populations are exposed and using that level of risk in a study is absolutely
essential to examining potentially beneficial interventions for those populations.
While justifying higher risks for a specific population may tread on dangerous
ground, there is a moral imperative to do so because without such research, there
will be fewer developments in the ways to lower those same higher risks. It would
not be possible to study a particular risk factor and try to find a way to alleviate it
in a practical manner unless the protocol continued to expose the population to
their normal daily risks for the duration of the study. In order for the results of a
study to be practically applicable to the population, the intervention must be tested
within the population's normal environment and daily risk exposures. In these
cases, the principle of justice demands that adequate research studies are carried
out with these populations in order to help lower the risks to which they are
exposed.
A real-life case example is provided by the placebo-controlled trials of the
"short-duration" AZT therapy in preventing perinatal transmission of HIV in
developing countries. Some opponents of the research argued that the research
subjects were unjustly treated in that they received a sub-standard level of care
during that trial. True, the subjects did not receive the best proven therapeutic
method available in industrialized countries (076 regimen), but the interventions
they did receive had the possibility of benefiting their specific situation. To ride an
ethical high horse about why research that is not acceptable for a child in America
should also not be acceptable for a child in a disease-torn country does a disservice
to the child who is subjected to the increased risks already. That child has the
potential to benefit from the research far more than the child in America, and the
risk/benefit analysis needs to take this into account in the determination of what is
they could potentially help keep their ill sibling alive) and therefore, were able to participate under 45
C.F.R. § 46.405.
99. 45 C.F.R. § 46.405 (2004), infra at 313-14.
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acceptable research. Levine argues that to use the 076 regimen in these countries
would have required an almost impossible revision of their perinatal customs
including requiring women to seek prenatal care much earlier than they are
accustomed, using intravenous medications, and finding a safe alternative to breast
feeding for babies of HIV-infected mothers in countries with no infant formula and
contaminated water supplies.1°° Levine asserts:
In summary, it is clear that the 076 regimen of AZT cannot be made
available to most HIV-infected pregnant women in the resource poor
countries now or in the foreseeable future. This is the main reason that
it is essential to find methods to reduce the rate of perinatal transmission
of HIV that are within the financial reach of the resource poor countries.
Finding these methods was the primary justification for conducting the
clinical trials of the short duration regimen of AZT. The cost of the
AZT in this regimen was about ten percent of that of the 076 regimen.
Moreover, there was no need for intravenous therapy or administration
of the drug to the babies. At the time the trials began, it seemed likely
that two of the countries could afford to provide the short duration
regimen if it proved effective; there was also a commitment from
international agencies to assist the other resource poor countries in
securing and providing the drug.' 0'
Another example provides additional clarity: If a child is already exposed to a
contaminated water supply and there are no resources to improve the supply, a
study to see if partially purified water alleviates some disease that is usually caused
by the impure water should be acceptable.' 0 2 Such a study submits the children to
a higher level of risk than an average healthy child, but it has the potential to
benefit the subjects in a way that healthy children would not benefit. To expose
the children to improperly cooked meat or another type of risk to which they are
not already exposed would not be permissible, even though it poses a similar level
of risk as the impure water, because the risk is not something already experienced
by the child. Furthermore, taking a child with a healthy water supply and
submitting her to impure water for the purpose of the research would also not be
permissible under section 405 because she does not gain any direct benefit from
the intervention. Although this scenario may seem far-fetched because pure water
100. Levine, supra note 53, at 563.
101. Id; see also COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MED. SCIS., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES
FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2002), http://www.fhi.org/fr/topicsf/
ethicsf/curriculum/pdf files/cioms.pdf (last visited June 28, 2005).
102. One might argue that in each of these cases the children are not truly exposed to a risky
intervention but instead something of potential benefit is withheld from them. The withheld benefit is
something to which they did not previously have access and will likely not have access to in the future.
True, the regulations do not specifically address this issue. But, in this hypothetical, one can imagine a
scenario where the method of partially purifying water exposes the children to an additional degree of
risk.
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is taken for granted in an industrialized country like America, the hypothetical is
analogous to a recent study involving lead abatement interventions to reduce lead
poisoning in children.
1. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute: Section 405 Gone Awry?
In 1993, the Environmental Protection Agency awarded a research grant to
the Kennedy Krieger Institute (KKI), a research institution affiliated with Johns
Hopkins University, entitled: "Evaluation of Efficacy of Residential Lead Based
Paint Repair and Maintenance Interventions."' 3  The study was designed to
compare comprehensive lead paint abatement with less-comprehensive repair and
maintenance interventions that would possibly be more cost effective. 0 4 There
were five arms to the study, three of which were interventions with different levels
of lead abatement and two of which were controls.'0 5 Researchers used houses that
were built before 1941 or had documented lead-based paint present for the
intervention groups.°6 Each of these three groups received a different amount of
money in either grants or loans for different levels of repairs and maintenance
aimed at reducing lead within the house. 10 7 Groups four and five consisted of
houses that were already lead abated or houses that were built after 1980 when lead
paint was no longer used.'0 8
The subjects enrolled in the study were the children of the families that
rented the homes. Some of the children were already living in the homes included
in the study, but importantly, some of the families moved to the houses during the
study because participation in the study allowed the properties to enter the rental
market.'0 9 Investigators recruited families with young children to occupy the
homes. Parents permitted their children to participate in the study and agreed to
submit them to as many as eight or nine blood tests within the following two years,
to allow their homes to be tested for lead periodically over that time period and to
answer questionnaires." 0
The Johns Hopkins University Joint Committee on Clinical Investigations,
the institution's IRB, initially questioned whether the use of healthy control
subjects in non lead-paint homes was permissible under the federal regulations
103. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 819 (Md. 2001). See also Hazel Glenn
Beh, The Role of Institutional Review Boards in Protecting Human Subjects: Are We Really Ready to
Fix a Broken System?, 26 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
104. Beh, supra note 103, at 4.
105. Id. at 5-6.
106. Id. at 5.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 5-6.
109. Id. Landlords participating in the study attempted to rent to families with young children and
in return, KKI helped the landlords apply for grants for lead abatement. Id. at 7.
110. Id. at 7.
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given that there was no real therapeutic benefit to these control subjects (and
therefore, the intervention could not be categorized under section 405).1i1 The
IRB therefore suggested that the consent form be changed to identify some
additional benefits that all subjects would receive by participating in the study.' 12
The IRB also wanted the consent form to indicate that the control group was being
studied to determine the amount of lead exposure these children would have
outside the house, and therefore, these children would also receive some benefit
from the study interventions. 13
Two of the families in the study later sued KKI when their children were
found to have increased levels of lead.1 4 The families alleged that KKI discovered
lead hazards in their respective homes and, despite having a duty to notify them,
failed to warn in a timely manner or otherwise act to prevent the children's
exposure to the known presence of lead." 5 Additionally, they alleged that they
were not fully informed of the risks of the research.' 16 The trial court in Baltimore
granted summary judgment in favor of KKI on the ground that KKI did not owe a
legal duty to the plaintiffs to warn them of the presence of lead dust but the
appellate court vacated the lower court's ruling and remanded for a trial." 7
Although the appellate court determined that KKI may have owed a legal duty to
the plaintiffs and that therefore summary judgment was improper, the appellate
court overstepped the limited question presented by the case and made several
statements in its opinion that are not in accordance with a reasonable interpretation
of the federal regulations.
From the facts available to the appellate court, it does appear that KKI's
protocol violated several of the federal regulations as well as basic ethical norms.
Some of the more egregious errors included: (1) enticing healthy controls to move
into lead-exposed housing (violation of section 404 because lead exposure is more
than minimal risk);" 8 (2) rephrasing the protocol (at the IRB's suggestion) so that
healthy controls in groups four and five were supposed to obtain some benefit from
the interventions even though it seemed unlikely that they were being exposed to
11. The IRB failed to appreciate that the control arms (houses without lead) did not pose greater
than minimal risk to the subjects and therefore was justifiable under § 404. Furthermore, if all the
children are viewed as being "at-risk" for lead exposure, then the subjects in the control arms, having
been removed from lead risks in the home, did benefit from the intervention. See Lainie Friedman
Ross, In Defense of the Hopkins Lead Abatement Studies, 30 J.L. MED & ETHICS 50, 52 (2002).
112. Beh, supra note 103, at 8.
113. Id.
114. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 818 (Md. 2001).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 818, 858.
118. Id. at 849. Even if being "at-risk" of lead poisoning qualifies as a "condition or disorder," §
45.406 may have been violated because the risk of living in lead contaminated housing may be more
than minor increase over minimal risk.
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lead outside the home (this was simply a disingenuous representation of the study);
(3) inadequate consent forms (violation of requirements for informed consent in
section 46.116); and (4) a several month delay in reporting the lead levels to the
families (violation of a promise made by KKI to the subjects). Although these
violations of the federal regulations and unethical acts can hardly be excused, it is
important to note that the Grimes Court also erred in several respects.
119
The Court made the pervasive mistake of classifying the research into
"therapeutic" and "non-therapeutic" categories and deeming the research study to
be "non-therapeutic." By adopting the "package deal" the court denied that any of
the interventions could have a direct benefit to any of the subjects. This in fact
was not the case. The children who were already living in the houses with high
lead levels did receive direct benefit by obtaining a degree of lead abatement in
their houses. 120 The Court stated: "We hold that in Maryland, a parent, appropriate
relative, or other applicable surrogate, cannot consent to the participation of a child
or other person under legal disability in nontherapeutic research or studies in which
there is any risk of injury or damage to the health of the subject."'' The Court
later explained this statement by insisting that it meant "minimal risk" when it
stated "any risk,"'122 but even given this clarification, the Court seemed to permit
only section 404 research and completely deny section 405 research, primarily
because it rejected the entire protocol instead of weighing the interventions'
potential benefits against the risks. The Court disregarded the permissibility of
approving non-beneficial procedures according to section 405.
In other words, if the protocol had included only houses that already had
children living in them, every child in the three intervention groups would have
received some benefit from being part of the trial because their lead exposure was
likely to decrease, and therefore, the trial should have been deemed acceptable
under section 405. Furthermore, the children in groups four and five would not be
subjected to the risk of lead and only required to have periodic venipunctures, an
intervention that, while not directly beneficial, poses only minimal risk and falls
119. Id. at 860 (Raker, J., concurring in result only). Judge Raker stated:
I cannot join in the majority's sweeping factual determinations that ... Institutional
Review Boards are not sufficiently objective to regulate the ethics of experimental
research; that it is never in the best interest of any child to be placed in a
nontherapeutic research study that might be hazardous to the child's health; that there
was no therapeutic value in the research for the child subjects involved; that the
research did not comply with applicable regulations; or that there was more than a
minimal risk involved in this study.
Id.
120. In fact, the partial lead abatement interventions were so effective that the program has been
replicated in 13 other cities. Robert M. Nelson, Nontherapeutic Research, Minimal Risk, and the
Kennedy Krieger Lead Abatement Study, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 7.
121. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858.
122. Ross, supra note 111, at 51.
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under the category of procedures that are approvable under section 404. From the
statements made by the Grimes Court, however, it appears that the Court would
not accept even this limited study because the continued exposure to some lead for
the intervention groups was more than a minimal risk. One might object to this
more limited study because the children in the intervention groups are not
receiving fully lead abated houses, but similar to the short-course AZT trials, this
population of children does not have realistic access to fully lead abated houses, so
certainly to help them a little is better than not to help at all. Unfortunately, the
Grimes Court overstepped the limited question presented to it, and its opinion,
taken to its fullest, would not permit even this hypothetical study where no
children are actively recruited to live in lead contaminated houses.
2 3
The Grimes opinion should raise warning bells. If the federal regulations are
not explicated further, either in the federal regulations themselves, or by an
authoritative governmental body, mistakes in interpretation will lead to results not
intended by the National Commission or the drafters of the regulations.
D. Section 406: Interventions with No Prospect of Direct Benefit to Subject
The third category involves interventions or procedures with no prospect of
direct benefit to the subject. For these types of studies, the intervention must
present only a minor increase over minimal risk to the subject, and the study must
be likely to yield knowledge about the child's disorder or condition that is of vital
importance for understanding or ameliorating the disorder or condition.
Furthermore, the intervention or procedure must present experiences to the subjects
that are reasonably commensurate with those experiences inherent to their actual or
expected medical, dental, psychological, social, or educational situations. 124 The
commensurability requirement exists because children who have had a particular
intervention previously are better able to understand what is being asked of
them,and therefore, their assent to participate in the study will be better
informed. 125 The questions of what constitutes a "minor increase" above minimal
risk, and what is meant by "disorder or condition" and "reasonably commensurate"
have produced considerable disagreement and serve as another source of differing
interpretations of the regulations.
A research protocol that might fall within this category is a trial that takes a
child with leukemia and subjects him or her to one additional bone marrow
123. This is an important distinction that sets this study apart from the Willowbrook studies. Even
if the prevalence of lead-tainted houses in the Baltimore area were 85%, it would not be permissible to
actively rent previously empty houses in the study to families with children. This is analogous to the
situation in Willowbrook where the children living in the house had an 85% risk of contracting
hepatitis. The high baseline risk does not give the researchers the right to turn a high risk into a definite
risk (either living in a lead contaminated house or contracting hepatitis) for a particular child.
124. 45 C.F.R. § 46.406 (2004), infra at 314.
125. LEVINE, supra note 8, at 248.
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aspirate in order to obtain information about the disease course, but the
information is not intended to benefit this particular child. It is imaginable that the
child with leukemia has already had a bone marrow aspirate and that another
aspirate would be reasonably commensurate with her actual experience so that if
she assents to participate, her assent is more informed than a child who has never
experienced a bone marrow aspirate. Furthermore, it is imaginable that such a
research study could be designed to yield generalizable knowledge about leukemia
that is of vital importance for its amelioration, and, therefore, such a trial would
fulfill the requirements set by section 406. In this hypothetical case, one additional
bone marrow aspirate is viewed as only a minor increase over minimal risk, but
what if the protocol called for two? Three? Ten? When does the protocol exceed
the threshold? Some might argue that it is not possible to set a threshold - that it is
an instinctual "gut feeling" that causes reviewers to know when the limit has been
exceeded. But surely this type of "I know it when I see it" standard that the
Supreme Court has used for recognizing pornography cannot be invoked when
errors in judgment potentially expose children to real danger.126 IRBs would be
hard pressed to find a public willing to accept such a subjective interpretation of
section 406.
1. Defining Minor Increase
The NHRPAC Children's Workgroup Report provided some insight into the
definition of "minor increase over minimal risk." The group concluded that
minimal risk itself should be an absolute standard but that minor increase over
minimal risk is a relative standard. It acknowledged that the concept of
commensurability is crucial to allow the child and parents to have a point of
reference from which to make their decision about participation. The Workgroup
report included lists of specific interventions and how they thought those
interventions should be classified. (See Tables 3 and 4) Nevertheless, these
recommendations are not universally agreed upon and local IRBs will differ on
their decisions of whether a particular research protocol is acceptable or not. Some
examples of what has been approved by Yale's IRB as presenting minor increases
above minimal risk include bone marrow aspirations in children with leukemia,
single additional spinal taps in adolescents who have already had at least one for a
neurological disorder, and administration of yohimbine in order to gain
information about the pathogenesis of a neurological disorder. This IRB rejected a
proposal to do left heart catheterizations on children at risk for the development of
cardiac hemosiderosis.'27
126. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
127. LEVINE, supra note 8, at 249.
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TABLE 3: COMMON PROCEDURES AND CATEGORY OF RISK 12 8
PROCEDURE* MINIMAL MINOR MORE THAN A
RISK INCREASE MINOR
OVER INCREASE OVER
MINIMAL MINIMAL
Routine history taking X
Venipuncture/fingerstick/heelstick X
Urine collection via bag X
Urine collection via catheter X
Urine collection via suprapubic X
tap
Chest xray X
Bone density test X
Wrist xray for bone age X
Lumbar puncture X
Collection of saliva X
Collection of small sample of hair X
Vision testing X
Hearing testing X
Complete neurological exam X
Oral glucose tolerance test X
Skin punch biopsy w/topical pain X
relief
Bone marrow aspirate w/topical X
pain relief
Organ biopsy X
Standard psychological tests X
Classroom observation X
* The category of risk is for a single procedure. Multiple or repetitive procedures
are likely to affect the level of risk.
128. WORKGROUP REPORT, supra note 95, at 5-6.
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TABLE 4: INTERPRETING LEVEL OF RISK IN COMMON PROCEDURES
129
PROCEDURE DETERMINANTS OF LEVEL OF RISK
Indwelling The level of risk may range from minimal to more than a
heparin lock minor increase over minimal depending on: age of the
catheter child, length of time catheter will be in place, number and
volume of samples, and setting of the research
Single SC or IM The level of risk of a single injection may range from
injection minimal to more than a minor increase over minimal
depending on the substance injected
Nasogastric tube Generally minor increase over minimal risk but should be
insertion commensurate with prior experience of the child in order to
provide adequate assent and permission
Small amount of Generally minor increase over minimal risk but must take
additional tissue into account any increased operative time, the specific
obtained at organ or tissue, and the likelihood of bleeding and infection
surgery
MRI If no sedation - generally minimal
If procedural sedation - generally minor increase over
minimal. Intubation in the appropriate setting may decrease
potential risks for certain children and its possible use
should be considered on a case by case and proposal by
proposal basis
Psychological test Generally minimal if performed under standardized
/survey/interview/ conditions but the level of risk may increase depending on
observation the sensitive nature of questions, the possibility to trigger
unpleasant memories or emotions, and the length of the
instrument or observation
One of the problems with the section 406 requirements is that it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to generate any control data with healthy children for
these types of studies. In the leukemia example above, it would not be permissible
to subject a healthy child to a bone marrow aspirate because it is a procedure that is
not reasonably commensurate with the child's actual or expected situation.
Furthermore, section 406 presupposes a clear line between a child with a disease
and a child who is healthy. As was demonstrated through the examples for section
405 research, the line is not always well demarcated because the more "at-risk" a
129. Id. at 7.
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population is, the more it may be considered unhealthy. In fact, the NHRPAC
Workgroup defined the concept of "disorder or condition" rather broadly:
We interpret the concept of disorder or condition as relating to a specific
characteristic which describes a group of children, a physical, social,
psychological, or neuro-developmental condition affecting children, or
the risk of certain children developing a disease in the future based on
diagnostic testing or physical examination. Thus, for example,
prematurity, infancy, adolescence, poverty, living in a compromised
physical environment, institutionalization, or having a genetic
predisposition to future illness are some of the disorders or conditions of
children that can, under the appropriate circumstances, warrant
permissible research that presents levels of risks that are a minor
increase over minimal without the prospect of direct benefit.130
The NHRPAC definition, therefore, seems to classify the risk of developing a
disease as a disorder and consequently widely broadens this category of research.
One might wonder, then, if the NHRPAC Workgroup would permit children in the
lead abatement study who have normal lead levels, but are at risk for developing
lead poisoning simply because they lived in an area of Baltimore where the
prevalence of living in a lead-tainted home is very high, to be enrolled in a lead
abatement study that presented a minor increase over minimal risk without any
intervention that could provide direct benefit to the subjects (i.e. the recruitment of
children from the area to move into the homes participating in the study).
The Workgroup provided an example of children who have a predisposition
to diabetes because of obesity being enrolled in a study that used various
procedures to assess insulin resistance.i 3i Although the risks posed by the
interventions would not be minimal because they are greater than those risks
normal, healthy children encounter, the study could be approved under section 406
because the interventions posed only a minor increase over minimal risk, the study
would be likely to yield generalizable knowledge of vital importance about the
development of diabetes or pathophysiology of obesity, the interventions
performed were commensurate with the expected experience of the subjects, and
the site for the study and skill of the investigator were appropriate. The NHRPAC
Workgroup meant to define disorder or condition more concretely, but their
example reveals how the line between healthy children and children with disorders
or conditions is very difficult to draw. For example, are children with a body mass
index in the ninety-fourth percentile at risk for diabetes and therefore qualify as
having a "condition"? 132 What definition of obesity should be used? When do
130. Id. at 3.
131. Id. at 7. But cf infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
132. The current definition for obesity in children is being above the ninety-fifth percentile of body
mass index. A body mass index that is between the eighty-fifth and ninety-fifth percentile is considered
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healthy populations become "at-risk"? The NHRPAC Workgroup's expansive
definition of condition or disorder will definitely engender debate, but certainly
such a definition does allow access to more control data, as the "at-risk" children
can serve as "control" subjects in many studies. It is important to recognize that as
the NHRPAC Workgroup's definition makes research using "control" subjects
easier, it does so at the expense of the commensurability safeguard, because these
children are less likely to fully understand whether the intervention in the protocol
is similar to an actual or expected situation.
Stephanie Amiel, a Yale pediatric endocrinologist studying diabetes,
completed a study in which "normal controls" were admitted for a 48-hour hospital
stay in order to allow a 24-hour blood hormone level profile through an
intravenous cannula, plus a 4-hour hormone sensitivity test through an additional
intravenous cannula. 33 This study could not be justified as presenting no more
than minimal risk because the psychological effects of a two-day hospital stay
were unknown. 13 4  The "normal controls" were actually siblings of diabetic
children and were judged to have a "condition or disorder," thereby permitting
review under section 406. The Yale IRB approved the study under section 406
because it presented only a minor increase above minimal risk. In retrospect, the
only harm actually suffered by the control subjects seems to have been
uncomfortable IV sites and boredom, so perhaps the study could have in fact been
approved under section 404 as causing no more than minimal risk. However, at
the time approval was sought the risks could not have been so easily calculated.
In contrast, the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
(NICHD), part of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), began a study to
determine population differences in insulin sensitivity, resting energy expenditure,
and body composition of obese children and children of obese parents in 1996,
which was subsequently terminated by the OHRP in 2000.135 The trial had
enrolled over 190 children aged six to ten before it was terminated. 136  The
investigators had planned to follow the children for fifteen years and collect blood
samples, radiographs, and magnetic resonance imaging scans, all of which were
considered to be minimal risk by the original review board that approved the
study. 137 Four years later, however, the OHRP stated that the interventions posed
overweight.. For more information, see WEBMD, HEALTH GUIDE A-Z, OBESITY: TOPIC OVERVIEW
(2005), at http://my.webmd.com/hw/weight control/hw252867.asp (last visited June 28, 2005).
133. Stephanie A. Amiel, Pediatric Research on Diabetes: The Problem of Hospitalizing Youthful
Subjects, IRB: A REV. OF HUM. SUBJECTS RES., Jan-Feb. 1985, at4.
134. LEVINE, supra note 8, at 249.
135. Letter from Michael A. Carome, Director, Div. of Compliance Oversight, U.S. Dep't of Health
and Human Servs., to Michael M. Gottesman, Deputy Director for Intramural Research, Nat'l lnsts. of
Health (Nov. 3, 2000), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/detrm letrs/novOOa.pdf (last visited June 28, 2005).
136. Eliot Marshall, Enforcers Halt NIH Study Called Less Risky Than Outdoor Play, 290 SCIENCE
1281, 1281 (2000).
137. Id.
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more than minimal risk, 138 did not present the prospect of direct benefit to the
subjects, and therefore could not be approved under section 404 or section 405,
respectively. Furthermore, it concluded that "these [non-obese healthy children]
do not have a disorder or condition," many of the interventions and procedures
were not reasonably commensurate with those inherent in their actual or expected
situations, and the risks exceeded a minor increase over minimal risk; therefore the
study also could not be approved under section 406.139 The OHRP recommended
that section 407 approval be sought and later terminated the trial.
140
The differences between the Amiel study and NICHD study seem slight, yet
the outcomes are quite dissimilar. Why do the siblings of diabetic children qualify
as having a "disease or condition" (and therefore obtain section 406 review) but the
non-obese children of obese parents do not? The siblings of the diabetic patients
have a higher risk of developing diabetes than the general population, but the same
could be argued for the non-obese children. Did the Yale IRB or the OHRP look
at empirical evidence to determine how "at-risk" these children were in their
determination of what qualifies as a "condition or disorder"? It seems unlikely
given that it is questionable whether such data exists. Neither the Yale IRB nor the
OHRP elucidated the definition of "disease or condition" on which they relied, yet
the difference in the outcomes hinges on these words.1 4 1 Once again, it is obvious
that reasonable people can and do interpret the federal regulations differently and
create drastically different end results.
E. Section 407: Research Not Otherwise Approvable
Finally, the last category outlined in Subpart D involves research that
would not be approvable under any of the aforementioned categories. In such
cases, if the IRB finds that the research presents a "reasonable opportunity to
further understanding, prevention, or alleviation of a serious problem affecting the
health or welfare of children," then the Secretary of the DHHS may consult with a
panel of experts, provide an opportunity for public review and comment, and then
possibly approve the research.14 2 The Secretary can find the protocol acceptable
by finding either that the research actually does satisfy the conditions of sections
404, 405, or 406, or that the research (1) presents a reasonable opportunity to
138. Id. The specific intervention that posed more than minimal risk was a "clamp" study that
required an overnight stay in the hospital with the insertion of two intravenous catheters so that insulin
and sugar could be infused while taking blood samples. The study would manipulate each child's blood
sugar between 80-200 mg/dL and measure the child's response. Id.
139. Letter from Michael A. Carome, supra note 135, at 5.
140. Id. at 6.
141. Although one could argue that even if the non-obese children were said to have a "condition or
disorder" the interventions posed more than a minor increase over minimal risk and still would not meet
the requirements of section 406. 45 C.F.R. § 46.406(a) (2004), infra at 314.
142. 45 C.F.R. § 46.407, infra at 314-15.
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further the understanding, prevention, or alleviation of a serious problem affecting
the health or welfare of children; (2) will be conducted in accordance with sound
ethical principles; and (3) adequate provisions are made for soliciting the assent of
children and the permission of their parents or guardians as set forth in section
46.407.143 Although this category has been used to permit research with children
infrequently, the OHRP lists six protocols as currently under section 407 review.'
44
In 1989, Prentice et al. published a description of a case that could not be
approved under sections 404, 405, and 406, and which also was not suitable for
section 407.145 The protocol was designed, in part, to determine whether a
biosynthetic growth hormone could promote linear growth in children suffering
from Turner Syndrome. 146 The control arm of the study was to receive placebo
injections three times per week, plus routine blood and urine exams, and
radiographs of the hands and wrists every six months to measure bone age. 47 The
multiple injections each week and the radiological examinations were judged to
present more than minimal risk to the subjects, so the protocol could not meet
section 404 approval.14 8 Furthermore, there was no firm evidence to support the
possibility that the placebo group would receive direct benefit from the injections
under the hypothesis that stress induces the release of natural growth hormone, so
the protocol could not satisfy section 405. The protocol did not meet section 406
approval because the placebo group would miss the opportunity to be treated with
available alternatives, such as different types of biosynthetic growth hormone,
estrogens, or androgens, posed more than a minor increase over minimal risk. The
multiple injections over eighteenmonths was not commensurate with the actual or
expected medical treatment of a patient with Turner syndrome; and, the research
would not yield generalizable knowledge about Turner syndrome of vital
importance for developing methods of treatment because there was no evidence to
show that the drug being tested would be any better than another biosynthetic drug
already being studied for the same purpose. 14 9 Finally, the IRB decided that the
protocol did not even qualify for section 407 review because they did not think
short stature was a "serious" enough condition to warrant attempting to get section
143. Id.
144. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS. (OHRP),
SPECIAL PROTECTIONS FOR CHILDREN As RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS (2004), http://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/children/ (last visited June 28, 2005).
145. Ernest D. Prentice et al., Can Children Be Enrolled in a Placebo-Controlled Randomized
Clinical Trial of Synthetic Growth Hormone?, IRB: A REV. OF HUM. SUBJECTS RES., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at
6-9.
146. Id. at 6. Turner Syndrome is an anomaly of the chromosomes whose characteristics include
short stature, webbed neck, infantile sexual development, and amenorrhea. The vast majority of
children with Turner Syndrome become significantly short adults. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 7.
149. Id. at 8-9.
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407 approval. 150 Interestingly, several years later, similar studies involving the use
of growth hormone in children with Turner syndrome or idiopathic short stature
were presented to an expert panel for section 407 review. 15' The studies were
designed as a double-blind randomized control with half the children receiving
human growth hormone (hGH) and the other half receiving placebo injections
three times per week for four to seven years. 52 Although the nine-member panel
disagreed about the risks involved with the study, in the end there was only one
member of the panel who thought the study could not be justified.'53 The
differences in the study described by Prentice and these more recent studies seem
slight, yet the latter was permitted under section 407 review and the earlier one was
not even able to receive section 407 review. There may have been evolving
thought over what constitutes a "serious" problem, but the evidence once again
points to the fact that reasonable people serving on different IRBs, facing similar
protocols, can reach very different results. 1
54
An example of a study recently approved under section 407 was a protocol
entitled, "Precursors to Diabetes in Japanese American Youth."' 155 Three hundred
children of Japanese ancestry and 150 Caucasian children would undergo several
routine examinations plus have blood drawn by venipuncture, intravenous glucose
tolerance tests, measurement of body composition by Dual X-ray Absorptiometry
(DEXA), and intra-abdominal fat determination by Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(MRI). 156 None of the interventions had the prospect of direct benefit to the
children, and several of these interventions were thought to involve more than
minimal risk. Nevertheless, the majority of the reviewing experts found that the
study could be approved under section 407 with the condition that the protocol and
consent forms be modified to further reduce the risks to the subjects. 57  The
experts found that the study could be approved because it presented a reasonable
opportunity to understand, prevent, or alleviate a serious problem affecting the
health and welfare of children. 158
150. Id. at 9.
151. Kopelman, supra note 90, at 755. Importantly, hGH was already the standard of care for
Turner Syndrome. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Kopelman served as one of the co-chairs of the review panel and was the only dissenting
member.
154. For an interesting discussion of whether a similar trial is ethically permissible involving
children with very short stature and not Turner's Syndrome, see Carol A. Tauer, The NIH Trials of
Growth Hormone for Short Stature, IRB: A REV. OF HUM. SUBJECTS RES., May-June 1994, at 1-9.
155. Report on Expert Panel Review Under Subpart D of 45 CFR 46: Precursors to Diabetes in
Japanese American Youth, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/pdjay/expert.htm (last visited June 28, 2005).
156. Id. at 2-3.
157. Id. at 3-4.
158. See id. at 4. This reasoning implies that the NICHD study would have received section 46.407
approval as well. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
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Some argue that this last category of research should be proscribed
altogether. Lainie Friedman Ross asserts that research in this category is entirely
immoral and that "the decision to balance the well-being of a particular child
against the possibility of significant societal benefit is a utilitarian calculus which
fails to respect the developing personhood of the individual child."' 59 Ross,
however, is too quick to equate a utilitarian analysis with evil when, in fact, most
research ethics entail justification according to a utilitarian analysis. It is equally
possible to imagine a child who wants to participate in a research trial that has no
component which is physically beneficial to him, but one where his psychological
well-being is increased because his participation in a study may help alleviate a
serious problem affecting children.' 60 To prevent such a child from participating in
a trial may just as easily fail to respect that child's developing personhood. The
onus is on the researcher to carefully assess whether the benefits to the child
outweigh the risks, but the lack of physical benefits should not preclude this
analysis. For example, a trial that involves multiple daily painful procedures for
the healthy control group but has the potential benefit of alleviating a severe illness
for the children in the intervention arms may be considered by a healthy child to be
a worthwhile sacrifice to make for the benefit of others. A utilitarian calculus can
just as easily take this into account and conclude that section 407 offers reasonable
safeguards for the welfare of children in these studies.
By devising four categories of risk, the federal regulations sought to
provide a level of protection for children proportionate to the level of risk to which
they are exposed. Nevertheless, although the regulations seek to provide guidance
to IRBs about the acceptability of research protocols, the language used in the
regulations, including "minor increase," "reasonably commensurate," "disorder or
condition," and "serious problem," are sufficiently vague so as to create a
battleground over how to define these terms. Even the relatively well-defined term
of "minimal risk" lends itself to multiple interpretations. Although some of these
words have reached consensus meanings eventually, not all have done so. The
definitional ambiguities leave an incredible amount of power in the hands of the
IRBs. How can we ensure IRBs will apply consistent interpretations of the
definitions and generate results that reflect the commitment to the principles of
respect for persons, beneficence and justice? How can courts be better informed
when facing cases involving children as research subjects so that they do not
commit the same mistakes the Grimes Court made and produce large discrepancies
between 1RB decisions and court decisions? One possible mechanism for
improvement is to restructure the IRB system.
159. Lainie Friedman Ross, Children as Research Subjects: A Proposal to Revise the Current
Federal Regulations Using a Moral Framework, 8 STAN. L.& POL'Y REV. 159, 167 (1997).
160. This very argument has been used to permit children to donate kidneys to their siblings or
undergo bone marrow transplant. Lederer & Grodin, supra note 1, at 106-9.
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PART IV: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
Disagreements over which interventions pose minimal risk or minor
increase over minimal risk exist among experts in the field and among members of
IRBs. In 1981, empirical work by Janofsky and Starfield found significant
differences among pediatric experts about how to assess the risks of a venous
blood draw, arterial puncture, and gastric and intestinal intubation. 16' They
concluded that the variability in risk assessment by those surveyed suggested that
their judgments were based on an inadequate body of knowledge. 162 In 1982,
Goldman and Katz published a controversial study of IRBs that concluded that
there were significant inconsistencies in both the application of the federal
regulations among many IRBs and in the application of ethical, methodological,
and informed-consent standards within individuals IRBs. 163 The researchers gave
three imperfect protocols to different IRBs to determine whether the boards would
identify the ethical, methodological, and consent form flaws and how they would
address these defects. 164 Goldman and Katz reported that IRBs neglected to make
the appropriate objections to the protocols and that there were internal
inconsistencies that indicated failures of the individual IRBs. 65 Levine responded
to the study by explaining why the Goldman-Katz protocols may have received
substandard review compared to most of the protocols presented to the Yale
IRB. 166 He reported that the Goldman-Katz protocols did not make proper use of
the primary reviewer system upon which Yale's system relies.' 67 Furthermore, the
protocols did not go through a second review after initial revisions were
recommended, thereby eliminating the opportunity to identify additional problems
with the protocols. Additionally, Goldman and Katz did not recognize some of the
ethical objections made by the Yale IRB and report them correctly. 168 Given
Levine's critique, one could assume that similar types of problems may have
occurred with the other IRBs that Goldman and Katz investigated.
Although the Goldman and Katz study definitely had flaws, there is no
denying that different IRBs do not always come to the same conclusion about the
161. Jeffrey Janofsky & Barbara Starfield, Assessment of Risk in Research on Children, 98 J.
PEDIATRICS 842, 844-45 (1981).
162. Id. at 845.
163. Jerry Goldman & Martin D. Katz, Inconsistency and Institutional Review Boards, 248 JAMA
197, 200 (1982).
164. Id. at 197.
165. Id. at 198-201.
166. Robert J. Levine, Inconsistency and IRBs: Flaws in the Goldman-Katz Study, IRB: A REV. OF
HUM. SUBJECTS RES., Jan.-Feb. 1984, 4-8.
167. Id. at 4.
168. Id. at 5; see also Gregory J. Hayes et al., A Survey of University Institutional Review Boards:
Characteristics, Policies, and Procedures, IRB: A REV. OF HUM. SUBJECTS RES., May-June 1995, at 4.
Hayes points to several problems with IRBs including lack of membership diversity, inadequate
expertise, observer drift, lack of an evaluation process and groupthink. Id. at 4-5.
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acceptability of a study. 169  Furthermore, as the discussion of terms such as
"minimal risk," "minor increase over minimal risk," and "disease or condition" in
Part III reflects, 1RBs continue to interpret these concepts differently because they
are difficult concepts to grasp from the outset. Even though the federal regulations
attempt to divide research protocols into four categories of risk and require
additional protections for children as the risks increase, the regulations obviously
have not created a simple framework that will always consistently be applied
among different IRBs and within any particular IRB. While perfect consistency
may be an unattainable goal, given the importance of protecting human subjects
equally, it is certainly a defensible goal.
The NHRPAC's Children's Working Group recognized several problems
with the interpretation of the current regulations governing clinical research
involving children. The group, however, concluded that the regulations do not
need revision but require clarification. The group is currently soliciting members
of research institutions to submit examples of research protocol that would be
approved under sections 404, 405, and 406.170 They plan to make the report
widely available to other advisory committees currently considering the issue of
protection for children in research. 7' Although the Working Group efforts should
be applauded, their report is unlikely to provide long-term solutions to the
problems of variable interpretation of words and inconsistent application of the
regulations because it is difficult to anticipate the ethical problems that future
protocols will pose.
The current system relies heavily on IRBs to perform efficiently and
appropriately. IRBs are required to review fundable federal grant proposals
involving human subjects, and all FDA regulated research, as well as most other
research involving human subjects to the extent specified in their institutions'
Federal Wide Assurances. 172  Additionally, IRBs must determine adequacy of
consent forms and conduct at least annual review of ongoing studies.' 73 Some
have argued that the increasing number and complexity of multicentered
randomized clinical trials overtax IRBs. 174  Others have argued that the real
problem is that IRBs are weighed down with tedious, low-yield, time-consuming
169. See supra text accompanying notes 133-141.
170. Andrew Kessler, Behavioral Science Working Group Looks at IRB Regulations, APS
OBSERVER (Am. Psychological Society), Dec., 2001, http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/
120 1/irb.html (last visited June 28, 2005).
171. Id.
172. See generally Assuring Compliance with this Policy - Research Conducted or Supported by
any Federal Department or Agency, 45 C.F.R. § 46.103 (2004), infra 323-25 (discussion of
requirements for assurances).
173. IRB Review of Research, 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2004), infra 326-27.
174. See William J. Burman et al., Breaking the Camel's Back: Multicenter Clinical Trials and
Local Institutional Review Boards, 134 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 152, 154-55 (2001) (arguing that
involvement of local IRBs in all aspects of multicenter clinical trials may overload the system).
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tasks. 7 5 Further criticism of the entire system is that the dependence on IRBs
yields inconsistent results.
Mashaw wrote that if an IRB is to "do its core job well, we must live with its
inevitable incompetence at other tasks. Moreover, we must also live with the
rather vague regulatory standards and with the continuing inability of the Federal
funding agencies to know for sure whether IRBs are functioning effectively."'
17 6
True, maybe the current scheme imposes too many demands on the local IRBs, but
instead of accepting the weaknesses in the system, perhaps a different system is
needed.
One way to establish clarification of the current regulations and create a
system that will encourage greater consistency while maintaining some flexibility
is to change the review board system. A restructured system that distributes duties
within a regulatory hierarchy will help solve the current problems and, perhaps
more importantly, provide a long-term solution by establishing a permanent
process by which to address new issues as they arise. Although the proposal that
follows discusses only the federal regulations involving children, one might
imagine a system where all protocols involving human subjects are able to use the
restructured review board system.
A. A Proposal to Restructure the Review Board System:
A new review board system will preserve the local IRBs and create twelve
Regional Review Boards (RRBs) and one National Review Board (NRB). The
system will use a hierarchical structure that is similar to the federal court system.
(See Figure 1.) The structure will include local IRBs with their current
membership, but their duties will be slightly different. The local IRBs will
continue to review protocols as required by section 46.108 and section 46.109,
except that under certain circumstances, they will have the discretion or the
requirement of forwarding protocols to their RRB. Although minimal risk
protocols are generally easy to spot, those protocols that do not clearly fall under
section 404 review can be forwarded, at the discretion of the local IRB, for
regional review. Furthermore, protocols that are reviewed under section 405 or
section 406 and are contentious with regard to what level of risk exists must be
forwarded to the RRB. Those that are contentious will include protocols where
there is disagreement between IRB members over how to classify the risks of the
interventions and procedures, and where no precedent exists for approving or
175. See Robert J. Levine, Editorial, Institutional Review Boards: A Crisis in Confidence, 134 ANN.
INTERNAL MED. 161 (2001) (discussing effectiveness of IRBs).
176. See LEVINE supra note 8, at 327 (quoting Jerry L. Mashaw, Thinking About Institutional
Review Boards, in THE PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND
BIOMEDICAL RES.: WHISTLEBLOWING IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR
RESPONDING TO REPORTS OF MISCONDUCT 22 (1982)).
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rejecting such a protocol. The precedent may exist from a protocol reviewed by
that same local IRB, the appropriate RRB, or the NRB. These rules regarding
what may be submitted for regional review should appropriately limit the number
of cases that are sent to the RRB, but still allow a sufficient number to pass to the
RRB so that it gains experience addressing these more difficult cases.
Finally, protocols that are determined to fall under section 407 review and
previously required the assembly of an expert panel will now receive automatic
NRB review. Section 407 will be amended to reflect that instead of asking the
Secretary to consult with a panel of experts, the IRB will ask the Secretary to
consult with the NRB to make a decision based on the remaining requirements of
section 407. The NRB will function as the expert panel in these cases.
FIGURE 1: ANALOGOUS STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL COURTS AND PROPOSED REVIEW
BOARDS
Supreme
Court National RB
s C
The intention behind enabling local IRBs to forward protocols to the RRBs is
to: 1) remove the responsibility of defining ambiguous terms from the IRBs who
have minimal time to devote to any one protocol; 2) encourage greater consistency
between local IRBs in their applications of federal regulations by mandating that
they look to precedents (including precedents from the regional and national
levels) when making decisions; 3) reduce the likelihood of conflicts of interest
and/or bias that can exist when local IRBs review their colleagues' proposals; and
4) decrease some of the time that local IRB members devote to reviewing difficult
protocols. Accusations have been made that local IRB members often do not fully
understand the nuances of the regulations, and therefore do not appropriately apply
them.'77 This new regulatory structure removes the more sophisticated analyses
177. See Bette-Jane Crigger, What Does It Mean to "'Review" a Protocol? Johns Hopkins & OHRP,
IRB: A REV. OF HUM. SUBJECTS RESEARCH, July-Aug. 2001, at 13-15. During the OHRP investigation
of the IRB system at Johns Hopkins University, the OHRP concluded that Hopkins failed to protect
human subjects appropriately after the death of a healthy twenty-four year old woman in research
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from the purview of local IRB members, who, despite a genuine interest in
research ethics, may not have the time or desire for appropriate training or
education in the field, and places them in the hands of a more qualified body.
In addition, investigators whose applications are denied at the local level will
be permitted to appeal their protocols to the RRB for reconsideration. Because the
RRB will meet less frequently than the local IRB, and thus there will likely be a
delay before a decision is made, most investigators will be dissuaded from
appealing their protocol unless they truly think it deserves another review. Given
the current lack of the need for an appeals process at some institutions, it seems
unlikely that this appellate function of the RRBs will be used very often, but its
existence is still valuable. 78 Finally, the local IRBs should continue to work
closely with local investigators, remain familiar with the local institutions, and
educate themselves and others regarding research ethics. The local IRBs'
unmatched experience with reviewing a large volume of protocols will enable them
to best identify ambiguities in the regulations and problems with their application
best and send protocols exemplifying these problems to the RRB level.
The RRBs will be organized and tailored to fit their charge. There will be
twelve regional RRBs, each one serving a specific geographic jurisdiction,
analogous to the federal Circuit Courts, and they should meet at least once a
month. Membership of an RRB should consist of representatives from its local
IRB constituents, but given the large number of local IRBs, a revolving
membership is needed to ensure adequate representation, but manageable meetings
and discussions. Each IRB may nominate one member to serve on the RRB. The
RRB Chair will review all those nominated and assemble a board of twenty to
thirty members that best reflect the constituents and meets the requirements of
section 46.107. Furthermore, no more than one member from any local IRB may
serve on the RRB. Membership should not exceed three years, and a revolving
membership should create a system that allows different local IRBs to have a turn
serving on the RRB. Large academic institutions with large numbers of research
studies under review, however, may end up serving on their RRB continually, but a
different representative from the institution should serve as the RRB member.
In addition, there should be at least one member of the RRB with full-time
duties. This member will be responsible for writing a synopsis of the discussion
and conclusion reached for the cases presented. The intention is that this will
include a more detailed summary than just minutes of the meeting. It will be a
sufficiently detailed synopsis that can serve as a precedent to which local IRBs can
turn for future guidance on similar issues. These case summaries should be
designed to study asthma physiology. Id. at 13. OHRP concluded that the large volume of research
overburdened IRB members and chairs and that members did not sufficiently understand the federal
regulations. Id. at 15.
178. See LEVINE, supra note 8, at 341 (reporting that an appeals process at Yale ceased to exist
because there were no requests for an appeal for over 15 years).
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published and catalogued in a searchable database for easy access by IRBs, the
NRB, and members of the public.
The RRB members will assume a higher degree of responsibility in
understanding the federal regulations and research ethics. To that end, members
will be required to undergo a well-structured, high-quality educational course.
This is not to say that the local IRB members are absolved of the duty to be well-
informed of the federal regulations and research ethics, but rather that a high-
quality, time-consuming educational system will be easier to initiate with a smaller
number of self-selected individuals who have a veritable interest in research
ethics. 179 Perhaps such an education system could later be extended to local IRB
members.
The charge to the RRBs will be to not only review the protocols sent by the
local IRBs, but to clearly summarize the way in which they choose to define
certain terms in the regulations. In other words, if the RRB decides that the child
of obese parents qualifies as having a "condition," the RRB must identify how they
reached that conclusion. If they relied on specific data to make a conclusion, that
should be identified as well. Furthermore, they must be bound by their own
precedents and those set by the NRB. This will ensure that their decisions are
internally consistent and, ideally, promote consistency among the various IRBs
within their jurisdiction. Because the members of the RRB will have a greater
understanding of research ethics and the regulatory guidelines due to their
education on the subjects, they will be in a better position to review these more
difficult protocols. Furthermore, because they will not oversee the expedited
review protocols or the minimal risk protocols, they should, ideally, have more
time to dedicate to each of the protocols that comes before them for review.
Finally, when the RRB members are unable to reach a consensus decision on a
particular protocol, they will be permitted to send up to twenty percent of their
protocols to the NRB.
Structurally, the benefit of having the RRBs follow the geographical
boundaries of the federal circuit courts is that if there are legal suits filed against
the investigators in any of these RRB-approved cases later, the district and circuit
courts will be able to look at the RRB approval summary statement to gain a better
understanding of why the protocol was approved. (See Table 5). Undoubtedly, the
RRB opinion will not be binding on the court, but it can serve as expert opinion
and evidence of what happened in the protocol review process. For example,
under this new review board system the recruitment of children who were "at risk"
of lead poisoning to live in partially lead-abated houses in the KKI protocol would
have flagged the case to go to an RRB review because it would be debatable
179. Cf Levine, supra note 175, at 162-63. Levine calls for an education system for all IRB staff
and members. Id. at 162. He further reflects on adding an accreditation system for IRBs and a
certification system for IRB staff. Id.
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whether these children had a "condition or disorder." If an RRB had granted
approval, the Grimes Court could have used the RRB written report to help
understand why the protocol was approved. One of the goals of creating a regional
review system is that it may prevent the development of a discrepancy between the
courts' legally binding opinions and the institutional review board decisions. By
providing the court system with a comprehensible, detailed summary of the
discussion that occurred during review, the court will be better able to understand
the issues at bar and hopefully will be less likely to overstep its bounds without
regard to the consequences, as did the Grimes court.
TABLE 5: CIRCUIT COURT JURISDICTION1 80
Circuit Court
l' Circuit
2 d Circuit
3 d Circuit
4 'h Circuit
5th Circuit
6 th Circuit
7 th Circuit
8th Circuit
9 th Circuit
10th Circuit
I Ith Circuit
District of
Columbia Circuit
Geographical Jurisdiction
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico and
Rhode Island
Connecticut, New York and Vermont
Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Virgin Islands
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and
West Virginia
District of the Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi and
Texas
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee
Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin
Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota and South Dakota
Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington
Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah and
Wyoming
Alabama, Florida and Georgia
District of Columbia
Because members of the RRB will be drawn from several local IRBs and the
proposals before them will be from a wide geographical area, the chances for a
conflict of interest between a member of the RRB and a researcher asking for
approval is significantly reduced. The RRB members will not be placed in the
180. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (West 1993 & Supp. 2004) (defining the thirteen judicial circuits). There
is also a Federal Circuit which has nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals in patent law cases and cases
decided by the Court of International Trade and the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295
(West 1993 & Supp. 2004) (defining the Federal Circuit).
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position of having to reject the research of their colleagues while at the same time
being fully aware that their own research needs IRB approval soon. A regional
review system creates distance between the researcher and the approval process
that removes local pressures and allows for a better, non-biased application of the
federal regulations.'8  Furthermore, because members would be from different
1RBs, they will be encouraged to share information about the structure and
effectiveness of their own IRB so that they may learn from one another.
Criticism launched against local IRBs has included the inability to police
themselves appropriately. By having a second board review contentious protocols,
the chances that the same biases or improper review processes will occur
diminishes, and respect for the local IRB system should improve.' 82 Local IRBs
that have received bad press in recent years will be better able to regain the trust of
their local community if the community knows that an additional regional review
may occur when the protocols involve procedures or interventions whose risks are
not easily classified.
The National Review Board will consist of one member of each RRB and
should meet at least four times a year. Additional members should include experts
in different disciplines and segments of society, as is required by section 46.107,
but total membership should not exceed twenty. Membership may be derived from
large and small institutions, policymakers, ethicists, lawyers, patients, and
advocates for vulnerable populations. Members will serve a maximum of five
years in order to create an evolving board that keeps up with developing ethical
understandings, changes in law, and advances in types of medical research. It will
also prevent the members from becoming complacent in their duties. All members
will be required to undergo extensive educational training on research ethics and
the federal regulations similar to the RRB requirements for membership. NRB
members should also have a thorough understanding of the OHRP, the history and
reports of the various committees that have been formed to address human research
issues (the National Commission, NHRPAC Workgroup, etc.), and why or why not
these committees have been successful in carrying out their charges. The NRB
should aspire to be the most successful of any of these bodies and draw upon the
experiences of these prior committees.
The NRB's duties will be to review those protocols that the RRBs ask it to
review, grant appellate review when an investigator has been denied at the IRB and
181. The Grimes Court claimed that such pressures were present in the Hopkins's IRB and
contributed to the protocol being miscast as having beneficial components for the control groups.
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 817 (Md. 2001).
182. Note that the local IRBs are not entirely bypassed by this new system. They remain the initial
reviewers and are able to decide when to send a protocol for RRB review. Cf Robert J. Levine & Louis
Lasagna, Demystifying Central Review Boards: Current Options and Future Directions, IRB: A REV.
OF HUM. SUBJECTS RES., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 1-2. In his discussion of Central Review Boards, Levine
asserts that academically oriented IRBs are unlikely to delegate the entirety of their responsibilities to
an off-site review board. Id.
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RRB level (exceedingly rare), 183 and most importantly, draft memoranda that will
clarify the language in the federal regulations.
In its case-review duties, the NRB will have access to the summary opinions
from all twelve of the RRBs, plus a member from each RRB present at the
meetings, and will be in the best position to apply consistent applications of the
regulations. Because the NRB will have a substantially smaller caseload than the
RRBs, it should have more than adequate time to spend on each case that it is
asked to review. The NRB should strive to reach consensus opinions, but if this is
not possible, at least a two-thirds majority should be required before a protocol can
be approved. This condition admittedly will and should protect human subjects at
the expense of limiting some important research. Similar to the RRB system, the
NRB should write a clear summary opinion as to how and why it reached its
conclusion. The NRB Chair will appoint a member of the NRB to write the
opinion for a particular case, and members may write additional concurring or
dissenting opinions if they wish.
The NRB will also serve as the "expert panel" for section 407 review.
Because it will have representation from all around the country and members who
are experts in the field, there should be no need to assemble a separate expert
panel. Furthermore, the NRB will be knowledgeable about national practices and
will ensure that the opinion is not out of line with current RRB and IRB decisions.
Moreover, by requiring the NRB to address the most problematic protocols that
raise the most difficult ethical issues, the NRB will begin to understand where the
real sources of conflict lie and how to best address them. The remainder of section
407 will be unchanged and the opportunity to consult with additional experts and
for public review and comment will still exist.
The most important function of the NRB will be to draft memoranda to
clarify the current federal regulations and make suggestions to Congress regarding
amendments to the regulations as needed. Through their case decisions, the NRB
members will gain experience in defining terms such as "minimal risk, "minor
increase," "reasonably commensurate," and "disorder or condition." Because they
will have actual experience with cases that they examine during their case-review
duties, they will be in a much better position to issue these memoranda than the
NHRPAC Working Group, National Bioethics Advisory Committee, or any of the
various other governmental bodies that have called for explication of the
regulations. Much like a court that hears cases, the NRB will be able to see the
practical effects of their decisions and therefore prevent interpretative mistakes that
are made when one deals only with the theoretical application of the regulations.
Case-based ethical reasoning rather than purely theoretical reasoning will be
far superior in balancing the advancement of medical research with the protection
183. Given that appeals to the NRB are likely to be rare, there should be no need for a certiorari
process analogous to the United States Supreme Court.
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of the rights and welfare of human subjects. The NRB actions will create
nationwide impact, and therefore, if their decisions are viewed as gravely wrong,
researchers will demand changes in the federal regulations. The NRB members
can consult national experts and use their experience to suggest appropriate
revisions to Congress. (See Table 6.)
TABLE 6: MEMBERSHIP AND DUTIES OF NEW REVIEW BOARD SYSTEM
BOARD MEMBERSHIP FUNCTIONS/EXPERTISE
As currently
defined by 45
C.F.R § 46.107 (at
least five members,
diversity of
backgrounds, at
least one member
with expertise in a
scientific area and
on member with
expertise in a
nonscientific area,
one member not
affiliated with the
institution)
Local
Institutional
Review
Board
(IRBs)
e review research as currently conducted
under § 46.108 and § 46.109 except:
- protocols that involve interventions or
procedures that are not clearly minimal
risk or less may be forwarded to the
appropriate RRB for review accompanied
by a statement for why review is
requested
- protocols falling under §405 and §406
that are contentious due to reliance on
ambiguous regulatory language and have
no prior precedent for approval must be
forwarded to the appropriate RRB for
review
- protocols seeking §407 review must be
forwarded to the NRB for review
9 review protocols as currently conducted
under § 46.110 (expedited review)
* maintain familiarity with local
institution conditions and investigators
9 continue to work closely with
investigators to assure human subject
protection
* educate investigators, board members
and community members regarding
research ethics
* where not otherwise stated, the current
IRB functions will continue
Specific Advantages:
* experience with reviewing large number
of protocols best enables them to identify
ambiguities in the regulations and
oroblems with their aolication and send
A A
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protocols exemplifying these problems to
the RRB level
Regional
Review
Boards
(RRBs)
* 12 members (one
from each RRB)
* additional
members, not to
exceed 8, drawn
from areas not
otherwise
represented by the
RRB
representatives;
these may be
investigators,
lawyers, ethicists
etc.
9 membership not
to exceed 5 years
* no more than one
member from each
local IRB
e revolving
membership so that
each RRB has no
more than 30
members and over
years, local IRBs
have the
opportunity to have
a representative
serve as a member
of their RRB
* membership not
to exceed 3 years
" review all protocols forwarded by RRBs
* review all § 46.407 protocols
* appellate function for investigators
denied at regional level
* draft memoranda to clarify federal
regulations as needed
9 maintain familiarity with state and
federal court cases involving human
subjects research and research ethics
a recommend changes to Congress as
needed
* maintain familiarity with research
studies nationwide and RRB review
decisions
Specific Advantages:
e ability to spend time drafting
memoranda to clarify federal regulations
drawing upon their knowledge of the
National
Review
Board
(NRB)
" review all protocols forwarded by IRBs
" appellate function for investigators
denied at local level
* send protocols for review to NRB at
RRB's discretion, but no more than 20%
of all protocols may be sent
o draft case summaries after making a
decision and circulate that decision to the
NRB and the local IRB who conducted
the initial review
o maintain familiarity with local IRBs'
decisions
Specific Advantages:
o information sharing between members
from different institutions at regional
meetings
o time available to discuss areas of
regulations that are ambiguous such as
"minor increase" "disease or condition"
"vital importance" etc. and make
decisions accordingly
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entire review board system and their
experience as a reviewing body
Indeed, one might argue that a hierarchical review board system will be
unwieldy and approval of research protocols will take too long, but that is all the
more reason to design the system to function efficiently. With appropriate parsing
of duties between the local, regional and national review boards, each group can
function more efficiently and, ideally, with a lesser workload. A more centralized
review organization encourages greater consistency, but maintaining the local
IRBs and including twelve RRBs still allows for flexibility within the system.
Local IRBs also reserve their autonomy as they are the ones that decide which
protocols to send to the RRB. It may be that local IRBs will not handle this
responsibility appropriately or refuse to send protocols to their RRB. Although it
is beyond the scope of this paper, such malfunctioning within the local IRBs
possibly could be dealt with by the accreditation systems that are in place and
beginning to function. 184 Above the local level, the regional review system and its
requirement of creating a database of written summary opinions are designed to
produce information sharing between IRBs. There is incredible value to knowing
how other local IRBs operate. It seems clear that the Yale system, which uses a
primary reviewer process, is believed to work well, 85 but certainly it is not the
only method being used. 186 Local IRBs would benefit from learning about each
others' processes to help increase efficiency and awareness of difficult protocol
decisions that are made. A hierarchical IRB system creates the opportunity for
each review board level to foster and develop specific strengths that will ultimately
afford greater protections for human subjects in clinical research.
CONCLUSION
Unethical research involving children has occurred throughout history. Only
in recent years have federal regulations been created in the United States to help
prevent further violations of human rights. The federal regulations are grounded in
the principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. They create a
valuable risk-based assessment system for evaluating research protocols, but the
regulations are fraught with imprecise language that often leads to their
inconsistent application and incongruous results. The KKI lead abatement study,
184. For information on accreditation programs, see ASS'N FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF HUMAN
RESEARCH PROT. PROGS., INC., ACCREDITATION STEP-BY-STEP (2005) at http://www.aahrpp.org/
www.aspx?PagelD=95 (last visited June 28, 2005).
185. See LEVINE, supra note 8, at 328-341 (providing an in-depth look at Yale's IRB system).
186. For a comparison of the primary review system with Johns Hopkins executive committee
system see David A. Blake, An Executive Committee System for IRBs, IRB: A REV. OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS RESEARCH, Nov. 1982, at 8-9.
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the Amiel and NICHD studies of children who were at risk for diabetes and obesity
respectively, and the human growth hormone studies are just a few examples of
protocols that, however well-intended, received widely differing views of their
acceptability, and ultimately had diverse outcomes. The definitions of "minor
increase," "reasonably commensurate," and "disorder or condition" continue to
plague those who are charged with interpreting the regulations.
The ambiguities in the federal regulations make them inherently difficult to
apply and, because IRBs are charged with their application but not their revision,
the IRBs are often blamed for inconsistent and ineffective applications. Amidst
the confusion over how to interpret words in the regulations, it is not surprising
that despite their best efforts, individual IRBs have been criticized for
inappropriately accepting or denying research protocols. Clarification of the
regulations protecting children are inevitably needed, but the substantive changes
to the regulations will not be realized without first making procedural changes.
The IRBs cannot take on the additional duties of interpreting and possibly revising
the regulations when they provide inadequate guidance.
A new review board system, modeled after the federal court system, will
redistribute some of these responsibilities and create boards that are better able to
carry out their specific mandates. Local IRBs will continue to oversee minimal
risk research, but will not be solely responsible for interpreting the more
ambiguous definitions in the regulations. Regional review boards, with members
who are well educated on research ethics and federal regulations, will assume some
of these duties. Finally, a national review board, which has some case-review
duties, will be best able to use case-based ethical reasoning and carry out the
mandate of drafting memoranda that clarify the federal regulations and
recommending changes to Congress as needed. An overhaul of the review board
system seems like a rather drastic proposal, but it may serve as the best way to
efficiently and effectively ensure the protection of human subjects, including
children, according to the principles of respect for persons, beneficence and justice.
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APPENDIX 1
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
45 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 46, SUBPART D
TITLE 45-PUBLIC WELFARE
SUBTITLE A-DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
SUBCHAPTER A-GENERAL ADMINISTRATION
PART 46-PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
SUBPART D-ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR CHILDREN INVOLVED
AS SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH
§ 46.401 To what do these regulations apply?
(a) This subpart applies to all research involving children as subjects, conducted or
supported by the Department of Health and Human Services.
(1) This includes research conducted by Department employees, except that each
head of an Operating Division of the Department may adopt such nonsubstantive,
procedural modifications as may be appropriate from an administrative standpoint.
(2) It also includes research conducted or supported by the Department of Health
and Human Services outside the United States, but in appropriate circumstances,
the Secretary may, under paragraph (e) of § 46.101 of Subpart A, waive the
applicability of some or all of the requirements of these regulations for research of
this type.
(b) Exemptions at § 46.101(b)(1) and (b)(3) through (b)(6) are applicable to this
subpart. The exemption at § 46.101 (b)(2) regarding educational tests is also
applicable to this subpart. However, the exemption at § 46.101 (b)(2) for research
involving survey or interview procedures or observations of public behavior does
not apply to research covered by this subpart, except for research involving
observation of public behavior when the investigator(s) do not participate in the
activities being observed.
(c) The exceptions, additions, and provisions for waiver as they appear in
paragraphs (c) through (i) of § 46.101 of Subpart A are applicable to this subpart.
§ 46.402 Definitions.
The definitions in § 46.102 of Subpart A shall be applicable to this subpart as well.
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In addition, as used in this subpart:
(a) "Children" are persons who have not attained the legal age for consent to
treatments or procedures involved in the research, under the applicable law of the
jurisdiction in which the research will be conducted.
(b) "Assent" means a child's affirmative agreement to participate in research. Mere
failure to object should not, absent affirmative agreement, be construed as assent.
(c) "Permission" means the agreement of parent(s) or guardian to the participation
of their child or ward in research.
(d) "Parent" means a child's biological or adoptive parent.
(e) "Guardian" means an individual who is authorized under applicable State or
local law to consent on behalf of a child to general medical care.
§ 46.403 IRB duties.
In addition to other responsibilities assigned to IRBs under this part, each IRB
shall review research covered by this subpart and approve only research which
satisfies the conditions of all applicable sections of this subpart.
§ 46.404 Research not involving greater than minimal risk.
HHS will conduct or fund research in which the IRB finds that no greater than
minimal risk to children is presented, only if the IRB finds that adequate provisions
are made for soliciting the assent of the children and the permission of their parents
or guardians, as set forth in § 46.408.
§ 46.405 Research involving greater than minimal risk but presenting the prospect
of direct benefit to the individual subiects.
HHS will conduct or fund research in which the IRB finds that more than minimal
risk to children is presented by an intervention or procedure that holds out the
prospect of direct benefit for the individual subject, or by a monitoring procedure
that is likely to contribute to the subject's well-being, only if the IRB finds that:
(a) The risk is justified by the anticipated benefit to the subjects;
(b) The relation of the anticipated benefit to the risk is at least as favorable to the
subjects as that presented by available alternative approaches; and
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(c) Adequate provisions are made for soliciting the assent of the children and
permission of their parents or guardians, as set forth in § 46.408.
§ 46.406 Research involving greater than minimal risk and no prospect of direct
benefit to individual subiects, but likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the
subiect's disorder or condition.
HHS will conduct or fund research in which the IRB finds that more than minimal
risk to children is presented by an intervention or procedure that does not hold out
the prospect of direct benefit for the individual subject, or by a monitoring
procedure which is not likely to contribute to the well-being of the subject, only if
the IRB finds that:
(a) The risk represents a minor increase over minimal risk;
(b) The intervention or procedure presents experiences to subjects that are
reasonably commensurate with those inherent in their actual or expected medical,
dental, psychological, social, or educational situations;
(c) The intervention or procedure is likely to yield generalizable knowledge about
the subjects' disorder or condition which is of vital importance for the
understanding or amelioration of the subjects' disorder or condition; and
(d) Adequate provisions are made for soliciting assent of the children and
permission of their parents or guardians, as set forth in § 46.408.
§ 46.407 Research not otherwise approvable which presents an opportunity to
understand, prevent, or alleviate a serious problem affecting the health or welfare
of children.
HHS will conduct or fund research that the IRB does not believe meets the
requirements of § 46.404, § 46.405, or § 46.406 only if:
(a) The IRB finds that the research presents a reasonable opportunity to further the
understanding, prevention, or alleviation of a serious problem affecting the health
or welfare of children; and
(b) The Secretary, after consultation with a panel of experts in pertinent disciplines
(for example: science, medicine, education, ethics, law) and following opportunity
for public review and comment, has determined either:
(1) That the research in fact satisfies the conditions of § 46.404, § 46.405, or §
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46.406, as applicable, or
(2) The following:
(i) The research presents a reasonable opportunity to further the understanding,
prevention, or alleviation of a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of
children;
(ii) The research will be conducted in accordance with sound ethical principles;
(iii) Adequate provisions are made for soliciting the assent of children and the
permission of their parents or guardians, as set forth in § 46.408.
8 46.408 Requirements for permission by parents or guardians and for assent by
children.
(a) In addition to the determinations required under other applicable sections of
this subpart, the IRB shall determine that adequate provisions are made for
soliciting the assent of the children, when in the judgment of the IRB the children
are capable of providing assent. In determining whether children are capable of
assenting, the IRB shall take into account the ages, maturity, and psychological
state of the children involved. This judgment may be made for all children to be
involved in research under a particular protocol, or for each child, as the IRB
deems appropriate. If the IRB determines that the capability of some or all of the
children is so limited that they cannot reasonably be consulted or that the
intervention or procedure involved in the research holds out a prospect of direct
benefit that is important to the health or well-being of the children and is available
only in the context of the research, the assent of the children is not a necessary
condition for proceeding with the research. Even where the IRB determines that
the subjects are capable of assenting, the IRB may still waive the assent
requirement under circumstances in which consent may be waived in accord with §
46.116 of Subpart A.
(b) In addition to the determinations required under other applicable sections of
this subpart, the IRB shall determine, in accordance with and to the extent that
consent is required by § 46.116 of Subpart A, that adequate provisions are made
for soliciting the permission of each child's parents or guardian. Where parental
permission is to be obtained, the IRB may find that the permission of one parent is
sufficient for research to be conducted under § 46.404 or § 46.405. Where research
is covered by §§ 46.406 and 46.407 and permission is to be obtained from parents,
both parents must give their permission unless one parent is deceased, unknown,
incompetent, or not reasonably available, or when only one parent has legal
responsibility for the care and custody of the child.
(c) In addition to the provisions for waiver contained in § 46.116 of Subpart A, if
the IRB determines that a research protocol is designed for conditions or for a
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subject population for which parental or guardian permission is not a reasonable
requirement to protect the subjects (for example, neglected or abused children), it
may waive the consent requirements in Subpart A of this part and paragraph (b) of
this section., provided an appropriate mechanism for protecting the children who
will participate as subjects in the research is substituted, and provided further that
the waiver is not inconsistent with Federal, state or local law. The choice of an
appropriate mechanism would depend upon the nature and purpose of the activities
described in the protocol, the risk and anticipated benefit to the research subjects,
and their age, maturity, status, and condition.
(d) Permission by parents or guardians shall be documented in accordance with
and to the extent required by § 46.117 of Subpart A.
(e) When the IRB determines that assent is required, it shall also determine
whether and how assent must be documented.
§ 46.409 Wards.
(a) Children who are wards of the state or any other agency, institution, or entity
can be included in research approved under § 46.406 or § 46.407 only if such
research is:
(1) Related to their status as wards; or
(2) Conducted in schools, camps, hospitals, institutions, or similar settings in
which the majority of children involved as subjects are not wards.
(b) If the research is approved under paragraph (a) of this section, the IRB shall
require appointment of an advocate for each child who is a ward, in addition to any
other individual acting on behalf of the child as guardian or in loco parentis. One
individual may serve as advocate for more than one child. The advocate shall be an
individual who has the background and experience to act in, and agrees to act in,
the best interests of the child for the duration of the child's participation in the
research and who is not associated in any way (except in the role as advocate or
member of the IRB) with the research, the investigator(s), or the guardian
organization.
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APPENDIX 2
THE NUREMBERG CODE
Permissible Medical Experiments
The great weight of the evidence before us to effect that certain types of
medical experiments on human beings, when kept within reasonably well-defined
bounds, conform to the ethics of the medical profession generally. The protagonists
of the practice of human experimentation justify their views on the basis that such
experiments yield results for the good of society that are unprocurable by other
methods or means of study. All agree, however, that certain basic principles must
be observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice,
without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-
reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter
involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This
latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the
experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and
purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted;
all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his
health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the
experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests
upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a
personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with
impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of
society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and
unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal
experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other
problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the
experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and
mental suffering and injury.
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5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe
that death or disabling injury will occur, except, perhaps, in those experiments
where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the
humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect
the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or
death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons.
The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the
experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to
bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where
continuation of the experiment seemed to him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to
terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the
exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him that
a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to
the experimental subject.
[VOL. 8:2:264
RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN
APPENDIX 3
WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
DECLARATION OF HELSINKI
Adopted by the 18th World Medical Assembly Helsinki, Finland, June 1964
and amended by the 29th World Medical Assembly Tokyo, Japan, October 1975
35th World Medical Assembly Venice, Italy, October 1983
and the 41st World Medical Assembly Hong Kong, September 1989
INTRODUCTION
It is the mission of the physician to safeguard the health of the people. His or
her knowledge and conscience are dedicated to the fulfillment of this mission.
The Declaration of Geneva of the World Medical Assembly binds the
physician with the words, "The health of my patient will be my first
consideration," and the International Code of Medical Ethics declares that, "A
physician shall act only in the patient's interest when providing medical care,
which might have the effect of weakening the physical and mental condition of the
patient."
The purpose of biomedical research involving human subjects must be to
improve diagnostic, therapeutic and prophylactic procedures, and the
understanding of the aetiology and pathogenesis of disease.
In current medical practice most diagnostic, therapeutic or prophylactic
procedures involve hazards. This applies especially to biomedical research.
Medical progress is based on research which ultimately must rest in part on
experimentation involving human subjects.
In the field of biomedical research a fundamental distinction must be
recognized between medical research, in which the aim is essentially diagnostic or
therapeutic for a patient, and medical research, the essential object of which is
purely scientific and without implying direct diagnostic or therapeutic value to the
person subjected to the research.
Special caution must be exercised in the conduct of research which may
affect the environment, and the welfare of animals used for research must be
respected.
Because it is essential that the results of laboratory experiments be applied to
human beings to further scientific knowledge and to help suffering humanity, the
World Medical Association has prepared the following recommendations as a
guide to every physician in biomedical research involving human subjects. They
should be kept under review in the future. It must be stressed that, the standards, as
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drafted are only a guide to physicians all over the world. Physicians are not
relieved from criminal, civil and ethical responsibilities under the laws of their own
countries.
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES
1. Biomedical research involving human subjects must conform to generally
accepted scientific principles, and should be based on adequately performed
laboratory and animal experimentation, and on a thorough knowledge of the
scientific literature.
2. The design and performance of each experimental procedure involving human
subjects should be clearly formulated in an experimental protocol, which should be
transmitted for consideration, comment and guidance to a specially appointed
committee independent of the investigator and the sponsor, provided that this
independent committee is in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
country, in which the research experiment is performed.
3. Biomedical research involving human subjects should be conducted only by
scientifically qualified persons, and under the supervision of a clinically competent
medical person. The responsibility for the human subject must always rest with a
medically qualified person, and never rest on the subject of the research, even
though the subject has given his or her consent.
4. Biomedical research involving human subjects cannot legitimately be carried out
unless the importance of the objective is in proportion to the inherent risk to the
subject.
5. Every biomedical research project involving human subjects should be preceded
by careful assessment of predictable risks, in comparison with foreseeable benefits
to the subject or to others. Concern for the interests of the subject must always
prevail over the interests of science and society.
6. The right of the research subject to safeguard his or her integrity must always be
respected. Every precaution should be taken to respect the privacy of the subject,
and to minimize the impact of the study on the subject's physical and mental
integrity, and on the personality of the subject.
7. Physicians should abstain from engaging in research projects involving human
subjects, unless they are satisfied that the hazards involved are believed to be
predictable. Physicians should cease any investigation, if the hazards are found to
outweigh the potential benefits.
8. In publication of the results of his or her research, the physician is obliged to
preserve the accuracy of the results. Reports of experimentation, not in accordance
with the principles laid down in this Declaration, should not be accepted for
publication.
9. In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be adequately
informed of the aims, methods, anticipated benefits and potential hazards of the
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study, and the discomfort it may entail. He or she should be informed that he or she
is a liberty to abstain from participation in the study, and that he or she is free to
withdraw his or her consent to participation at any time. The physician should then
obtain the subject's freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing.
10. When obtaining informed consent for the research project, the physician should
be particularly cautious, if the subject is in a dependent relationship to him or her,
or may consent under duress. In that case, the informed consent should be obtained
by a physician who is not engaged in the investigation, and who is completely
independent of this official relationship.
11. In case of legal incompetence, informed consent should be obtained from the
legal guardian in accordance with national legislation. Where physical or mental
incapacity makes it impossible to obtain informed consent, or when the subject is a
minor, permission from the responsible relative replaces that of the subject, in
accordance with national legislation. Whenever the minor child is in fact able to
give a consent, the minor's consent must be obtained in addition to the consent of
the minor's legal guardian.
12. The research protocol should always contain a statement of the ethical
considerations involved, and should indicate that the principles enunciated in the
present Declaration are complied with.
II. MEDICAL RESEARCH COMBINED WITH CLINICAL CARE (CLINICAL RESEARCH)
1. In the treatment of the sick person, the physician must be free to use a new
diagnostic and therapeutic measure, if, in his or her judgment it offers hope of
saving life, reestablishing health or alleviating suffering.
2. The potential benefits, hazards and discomfort of a new method should be
weighed against the advantages of the best current diagnostic and therapeutic
methods.
3. In any medical study, every patient - including those of a control group, if any-
should be assured of the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic method.
4. The refusal of the patient to participate in a study must never interfere with the
physician-patient relationship.
5. If the physician considers it essential not to obtain informed consent, the specific
reasons for this proposal should be stated in the experimental protocol for
transmission to the independent committee (I. 2).
6. The physician can combine medical research with professional care, the
objective being the acquisition of new medical knowledge, only to the extent that
medical research is justified by its potential diagnostic or therapeutic value for the
patient.
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11. NON-THERAPEUTIC BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS
(NON-CLINICAL BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH)
1. In the purely scientific application of medical research carried out on a human
being, it is the duty of the physician to remain the protector of the life and health of
that person, on whom biomedical research is being carried out.
2. The subjects should be volunteers-either healthy persons, or patients for whom
the experimental design is not related to the patient's illness.
3. The investigator or the investigating team should discontinue the research if in
his/her or their judgment it may, if continued, be harmful to the individual.
4. In research on man, the interest of science and society should never take
precedence over considerations related to the well being of the subject.
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APPENDIX 4
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
45 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 46,
SELECTED SECTIONS RELATING TO INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARDS
TITLE 45-PUBLIC WELFARE
SUBTITLE A-DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
SUBCHAPTER A-GENERAL ADMINISTRATION
PART 46-PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
SUBPART A-BASIC HHS POLICY FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RESEARCH SUBJECTS
§ 46.103 Assuring compliance with this policy-research conducted or supported
by any Federal Department or Agency.
(a) Each institution engaged in research which is covered by this policy and which
is conducted or supported by a federal department or agency shall provide written
assurance satisfactory to the department or agency head that it will comply with the
requirements set forth in this policy. In lieu of requiring submission of an
assurance, individual department or agency heads shall accept the existence of a
current assurance, appropriate for the research in question, on file with the Office
for Protection from Research Risks, HHS, and approved for federalwide use by
that office. When the existence of an HHS-approved assurance is accepted in lieu
of requiring submission of an assurance, reports (except certification) required by
this policy to be made to department and agency heads shall also be made to the
Office for Protection from Research Risks, HHS.
(b) Departments and agencies will conduct or support research covered by this
policy only if the institution has an assurance approved as provided in this section,
and only if the institution has certified to the department or agency head that the
research has been reviewed and approved by an IRB provided for in the assurance,
and will be subject to continuing review by the IRB. Assurances applicable to
federally supported or conducted research shall at a minimum include:
(1) A statement of principles governing the institution in the discharge of its
responsibilities for protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects of research
conducted at or sponsored by the institution, regardless of whether the research is
subject to federal regulation. This may include an appropriate existing code,
declaration, or statement of ethical principles, or a statement formulated by the
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institution itself. This requirement does not preempt provisions of this policy
applicable to department- or agency-supported or regulated research and need not
be applicable to any research exempted or waived under § 46.101 (b) or (i).
(2) Designation of one or more IRBs established in accordance with the
requirements of this policy, and for which provisions are made for meeting space
and sufficient staff to support the IRB's review and recordkeeping duties.
(3) A list of IRB members identified by name; earned degrees; representative
capacity; indications of experience such as board certifications, licenses, etc.,
sufficient to describe each member's chief anticipated contributions to IRB
deliberations; and any employment or other relationship between each member and
the institution; for example: full-time employee, part-time employee, member of
governing panel or board, stockholder, paid or unpaid consultant. Changes in IRB
membership shall be reported to the department or agency head, unless in accord
with § 46.103(a) of this policy, the existence of an HHS-approved assurance is
accepted. In this case, change in IRB membership shall be reported to the Office
for Protection from Research Risks, HHS.
(4) Written procedures which the IRB will follow (i) for conducting its initial and
continuing review of research and for reporting its findings and actions to the
investigator and the institution; (ii) for determining which projects require review
more often than annually and which projects need verification from sources other
than the investigators that no material changes have occurred since previous IRB
review; and (iii) for ensuring prompt reporting to the IRB of proposed changes in a
research activity, and for ensuring that such changes in approved research, during
the period for which IRB approval has already been given, may not be initiated
without IRB review and approval except when necessary to eliminate apparent
immediate hazards to the subject.
(5) Written procedures for ensuring prompt reporting to the IRB, appropriate
institutional officials, and the department or agency head of(i) any unanticipated
problems involving risks to subjects or others or any serious or continuing
noncompliance with this policy or the requirements or determinations of the IRB
and (ii) any suspension or termination of IRB approval.
(c) The assurance shall be executed by an individual authorized to act for the
institution and to assume on behalf of the institution the obligations imposed by
this policy and shall be filed in such form and manner as the department or agency
head prescribes.
(d) The department or agency head will evaluate all assurances submitted in
accordance with this policy through such officers and employees of the department
or agency and such experts or consultants engaged for this purpose as the
department or agency head determines to be appropriate. The department or
agency head's evaluation will take into consideration the adequacy of the proposed
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IRB in light of the anticipated scope of the institution's research activities and the
types of subject populations likely to be involved, the appropriateness of the
proposed initial and continuing review procedures in light of the probable risks,
and the size and complexity of the institution.
(e) On the basis of this evaluation, the department or agency head may approve or
disapprove the assurance, or enter into negotiations to develop an approvable one.
The department or agency head may limit the period during which any particular
approved assurance or class of approved assurances shall remain effective or
otherwise condition or restrict approval.
(f) Certification is required when the research is supported by a federal department
or agency and not otherwise exempted or waived under § 46.101 (b) or (i). An
institution with an approved assurance shall certify that each application or
proposal for research covered by the assurance and by § 46.103 of this Policy has
been reviewed and approved by the IRB. Such certification must be submitted with
the application or proposal or by such later date as may be prescribed by the
department or agency to which the application or proposal is submitted. Under no
condition shall research covered by § 46.103 of the Policy be supported prior to
receipt of the certification that the research has been reviewed and approved by the
1RB. Institutions without an approved assurance covering the research shall certify
within 30 days after receipt of a request for such a certification from the
department or agency, that the application or proposal has been approved by the
IRB. If the certification is not submitted within these time limits, the application or
proposal may be returned to the institution.
§ 46.107 IRB membership.
(a) Each IRB shall have at least five members, with varying backgrounds to
promote complete and adequate review of research activities commonly conducted
by the institution. The IRB shall be sufficiently qualified through the experience
and expertise of its members, and the diversity of the members, including
consideration of race, gender, and cultural backgrounds and sensitivity to such
issues as community attitudes, to promote respect for its advice and counsel in
safeguarding the rights and welfare of human subjects. In addition to possessing
the professional competence necessary to review specific research activities, the
IRB shall be able to ascertain the acceptability of proposed research in terms of
institutional commitments and regulations, applicable law, and standards of
professional conduct and practice. The IRB shall therefore include persons
knowledgeable in these areas. If an IRB regularly reviews research that involves a
vulnerable category of subjects, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, or
handicapped or mentally disabled persons, consideration shall be given to the
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inclusion of one or more individuals who are knowledgeable about and
experienced in working with these subjects.
(b) Every nondiscriminatory effort will be made to ensure that no IRB consists
entirely of men or entirely of women, including the institution's consideration of
qualified persons of both sexes, so long as no selection is made to the IRB on the
basis of gender. No IRB may consist entirely of members of one profession.
(c) Each IRB shall include at least one member whose primary concerns are in
scientific areas and at least one member whose primary concerns are in
nonscientific areas.
(d) Each IRB shall include at least one member who is not otherwise affiliated with
the institution and who is not part of the immediate family of a person who is
affiliated with the institution.
(e) No IRB may have a member participate in the IRB's initial or continuing
review of any project in which the member has a conflicting interest, except to
provide information requested by the IRB.
(f) An IR3 may, in its discretion, invite individuals with competence in special
areas to assist in the review of issues which require expertise beyond or in addition
to that available on the IRB. These individuals may not vote with the IRB.
§ 46.108 IRB functions and operations.
In order to fulfill the requirements of this policy each IRB shall:
(a) Follow written procedures in the same detail as described in § 46.103(b)(4) and,
to the extent required by, § 46.103(b)(5).
(b) Except when an expedited review procedure is used (see § 46.110), review
proposed research at convened meetings at which a majority of the members of the
IR13 are present, including at least one member whose primary concerns are in
nonscientific areas. In order for the research to be approved, it shall receive the
approval of a majority of those members present at the meeting.
§ 46.109 IRB Review of Research.
(a) An IRB shall review and have authority to approve, require modifications in (to
secure approval), or disapprove all research activities covered by this policy.
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(b) An IRB shall require that information given to subjects as part of informed
consent is in accordance with § 46.116. The IRB may require that information, in
addition to that specifically mentioned in § 46.116, be given to the subjects when
in the IRB's judgment the information would meaningfully add to the protection of
the rights and welfare of subjects.
(c) An IRB shall require documentation of informed consent or may waive
documentation in accordance with § 46.117.
(d) An IRB shall notify investigators and the institution in writing of its decision to
approve or disapprove the proposed research activity, or of modifications required
to secure IRB approval of the research activity. If the IRB decides to disapprove a
research activity, it shall include in its written notification a statement of the
reasons for its decision and give the investigator an opportunity to respond in
person or in writing.
(e) An IRB shall conduct continuing review of research covered by this policy at
intervals appropriate to the degree of risk, but not less than once per year, and shall
have authority to observe or have a third party observe the consent process and the
research.
§ 46.110 Expedited review procedures for certain kinds of research involving no
more than minimal risk, and for minor changes in approved research.
(a) The Secretary, HHS, has established, and published as a Notice in the
FEDERALREGISTER, a list of categories of research that may be reviewed by the
IRB through an expedited review procedure. The list will be amended, as
appropriate after consultation with other departments and agencies, through
periodic republication by the Secretary, HHS, in the FEDERAL REGISTER. A copy
of the list is available from the Office for Protection from Research Risks, National
Institutes of Health, HHS, Bethesda, Maryland 20892.
(b) An IRB may use the expedited review procedure to review either or both of the
following:
(1) Some or all of the research appearing on the list and found by the reviewer(s) to
involve no more than minimal risk,
(2) Minor changes in previously approved research during the period (of one year
or less) for which approval is authorized.
Under an expedited review procedure, the review may be carried out by the IRB
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chairperson or by one or more experienced reviewers designated by the
chairperson from among members of the IRB. In reviewing the research, the
reviewers may exercise all of the authorities of the IRB except that the reviewers
may not disapprove the research. A research activity may be disapproved only after
review in accordance with the non-expedited procedure set forth in § 46.108(b).
(c) Each IRB which uses an expedited review procedure shall adopt a method for
keeping all members advised of research proposals which have been approved
under the procedure.
(d) The department or agency head may restrict, suspend, terminate, or choose not
to authorize an institution's or IRB's use of the expedited review procedure.
§ 46.111 Criteria for IRB approval of research.
(a) In order to approve research covered by this policy the IRB shall determine
that all of the following requirements are satisfied:
(1) Risks to subjects are minimized: (i) By using procedures which are consistent
with sound research design and which do not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk,
and (ii) whenever appropriate, by using procedures already being performed on the
subjects for diagnostic or treatment purposes.
(2) Risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to
subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to
result. In evaluating risks and benefits, the IRB should consider only those risks
and benefits that may result from the research (as distinguished from risks and
benefits of therapies subjects would receive even if not participating in the
research). The IRB should not consider possible long-range effects of applying
knowledge gained in the research (for example, the possible effects of the research
on public policy) as among those research risks that fall within the purview of its
responsibility.
(3) Selection of subjects is equitable. In making this assessment the IRB should
take into account the purposes of the research and the setting in which the research
will be conducted and should be particularly cognizant of the special problems of
research involving vulnerable populations, such as children, prisoners, pregnant
women, mentally disabled persons, or economically or educationally
disadvantaged persons.
(4) Informed consent will be sought from each prospective subject or the subject's
legally authorized representative, in accordance with, and to the extent required by
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§ 46.116.
(5) Informed consent will be appropriately documented, in accordance with, and to
the extent required by § 46.117.
(6) When appropriate, the research plan makes adequate provision for monitoring
the data collected to ensure the safety of subjects.
(7) When appropriate, there are adequate provisions to protect the privacy of
subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data.
(b) When some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or
undue influence, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled
persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons, additional
safeguards have been included in the study to protect the rights and welfare of
these subjects.
§ 46.114 Cooperative research.
Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which
involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects,
each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and welfare of human
subjects and for complying with this policy. With the approval of the department
or agency head, an institution participating in a cooperative project may enter into
a joint review arrangement, rely upon the review of another qualified IRB, or make
similar arrangements for avoiding duplication of effort.
§ 46.115 IRB records.
(a) An institution, or when appropriate an IRB, shall prepare and maintain
adequate documentation of IRB activities, including the following:
(1) Copies of all research proposals reviewed, scientific evaluations, if any, that
accompany the proposals, approved sample consent documents, progress reports
submitted by investigators, and reports of injuries to subjects.
(2) Minutes of IRB meetings which shall be in sufficient detail to show attendance
at the meetings; actions taken by the IRB; the vote on these actions including the
number of members voting for, against, and abstaining; the basis for requiring
changes in or disapproving research; and a written summary of the discussion of
controverted issues and their resolution.
(3) Records of continuing review activities.
(4) Copies of all correspondence between the IRB and the investigators.
(5) A list of IRB members in the same detail as described is § 46.103(b)(3).
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(6) Written procedures for the IRB in the same detail as described in §
46.103(b)(4) and § 46.103(b)(5).
(7) Statements of significant new findings provided to subjects, as required by §
46.116(b)(5).
(b) The records required by this policy shall be retained for at least 3 years, and
records relating to research which is conducted shall be retained for at least 3 years
after completion of the research. All records shall be accessible for inspection and
copying by authorized representatives of the department or agency at reasonable
times and in a reasonable manner.
DO PREGNANT WOMEN HAVE (LIVING) WILL?*
DANIEL SPERLING**
Living wills are documents that instruct health care providers about
particular kinds of medical care that an individual would or would not want to have
if rendered incompetent. Under the American legal system, pregnant women are
not typically allowed to express their will merely due to the fact they are pregnant.
In other cases, their will is much weaker than those of other women, not to mention
those of other men. In Canada, however, the law is silent on this matter: in
contrast to the American legal system, no special provision relates to the state of
pregnancy. From this silence one can infer two possible conclusions. According
to the first, Canada has a gap in its living will legislation concerning pregnant
women. This gap could be attributed to legislators who were not fully aware of the
possibility that incompetency may also occur during pregnancy. According to the
second potential conclusion, Canada considered the American model and decided
to reject it due to legal and cultural differences between the two nations. Of
course, choosing one interpretation over the other has far-reaching practical
implications. But, what do we have to choose?
It is believed that advance directives in general, and living wills in particular,
have three important purposes. 2  First, by issuing an advance directive, an
individual is exercising her control over health care decisions concerning her body
and State of health. Validating an advance directive is giving respect to the
patient's prior wishes and to her right to self-determination, which does not
extinguish should the signor of the advance directive become incompetent.
3
However, advance directives also have an important procedural role: they prevent
the need to go to court whenever a problem occurs as to what the patient would
have decided in the relevant case had she had the opportunity to do so. Just as
* This Article is an excerpt from chapter 3 of my book, MANAGEMENT OF POST-MORTEM PREGNANCY:
LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS, forthcoming with Ashgate in 2005.
** S.J.D. Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
1. The degree of incompetency under which an advance directive should operate is debatable.
Originally, advance directives apply when the patient is alive but incapacitated, and unable to make
reasonable, or indeed, any decision concerning his or her health matters. However, it seems plausible to
argue that advance directives can also apply when the patient becomes dead. Under these
circumstances, an advance directive functions like a donor card or a will, providing for treatment of the
body after death. Ed Newman, Ethical Issues in Terminal Health Care, Part Four: Patients Have
Rights, but Doctors Have Rights, Too (1992), http://www.cp.duluth.mn.us/-ennyman/DAS-4.html (last
visited May 18, 2005).
2. ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 6 (2d ed. 1995).
3. Id.
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important, they provide physicians with immunity from civil and criminal liability
by offering solutions that reside with the patient, even when incompetent.4
Legislation usually regulates advance directives. Advance directive statutes
allow individuals to make decisions about the kind of care they want, if they are
unable to make decisions on their own, and to appoint another person to make
those decisions for them. They provide a mechanism that advances the ethical
principles of individual autonomy, self-determination, and bodily integrity. The
legislation provides the form of the document, the procedure to create it, and the
scope of its effect. Living will legislation actually reflects the recognition by the
state that the incompetent adult has the right, if the expression of intent is made, to
have medical treatment discontinued or otherwise prescribed, and, thus, that courts
should uphold the individual's living will.
A. CANADA
In Canada, advance directive legislation exists over almost all the country.'
Such legislation covers the provinces of Alberta,6 British Columbia,7 Manitoba,
New Brunswick, 9  Newfoundland,' °  Nova Scotia,
11  Ontario, 12  Quebec, 13
Saskatchewan, 14 Prince Edward Island, 15 and Yukon Territory. 16  Although
legislation varies among these provinces and territories, none of these extensive
4. Id. at 7.
5. For a discussion of the legal status of living wills in Canada see UNIV. OF TORONTO JOINT
CENTRE FOR BIOETHICS, LIVING WILLS, http://www.utoronto.ca/jcb/outreach/livingwills_
download.htm (last visited May 18, 2005). See generally Quality of End-of-Life Care: The Right of
Every Canadian: Subcomm. To update "Of Life and Death" of the Standing Senate Comm. on Social
Affairs, Science and Technology, (2000), http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-
e/upda-e/rep-e/repfinjun00-e.htm (last visited May 18, 2005) (providing a detailed explanation of the
legislation).
6. Personal Directives Act, S.A., ch. P-4.03 (1996) (Can.), repealed by R.S.A., ch. S-19, § 7
(2000) (Can.).
7. Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 405 (1996) (Can.), http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/
statreg/stat/R/96405_01.htm (last visited May 18, 2005).
8. The Health Care Directives and Consequential Amendments Act, S.M., ch. 33 (1992) (Can.).
9. Infirm Persons Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, ch. 1-8. (1973), amended by ch. 45, 2000 S.N.B. I (Can.).
10. Advance Health Care Directives Act, S.NFLD., ch. A-4.1 (1995) (Can.),
http://www.gov.nf.ca/hoa/sr (last visited May 18, 2005).
11. Medical Consent Act, R.S.N.S., ch. 279, § 1 (1989) (Can.), http://www.canlii.org/ns/laws/
sta/rl989c.279/20041103/whole.html (last visited May 18, 2005).
12. Substitute Decisions Act, S.O., ch. 30 (1992) (Can.).
13. Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q., ch. 64, § I (1991) (Can.).
14. Health Care Directive and Substitute Health Care Decision Makers Act, S.S., ch. H-0.001
(1997) (Can.).
15. Consent to Treatment and Health Care Directives Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. 10 (1996), amended by
ch. 5, 2000 R.S.P.E.I. (Can.).
16. Enduring Power of Attorney Act, R.S.Y.T., ch. 73 (2002) (Can.), http://www.canlii.org/yk/
sta/pdf/ch73.pdf (last visited May 18, 2005).
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legislative frameworks has a specific provision from which one can infer that the
legal effect of an advance directive is influenced by whether the patient, who
issued the living will, is pregnant or not. Thus, it seems that without any specific
regulations for pregnant women deemed incompetent, Canadian law treats the
incompetent pregnant woman who issued an advance directive while competent
the same way as it treats other incompetent patients, that is, it respects the patient's
right to control his or her care.
B. UNITED STATES
1. Regulation of Pregnancy Clauses
The legal structure of living will legislation regarding incompetent
pregnant women is different in the United States than in Canada. Generally, in the
United States, living will legislation of states differs from the Canadian legislation
in that they allow the use of a living will only when a patient is terminally ill, or
after a prognosis showing that the patient would not recover. While all the states
have enacted some form of advance directive legislation, only 35 contemplate the
validity of the advance directive when a woman is pregnant.' 7 Each of these
statutes has specific guidelines as to the applicability of an advance directive when
a woman who makes the advance directive is pregnant. While these guidelines
reflect a practical balance between the constitutional rights of an incompetent
17. These states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 22-8A (1997 & Supp. 2004); Alaska, ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.52.055 (Michie 2004); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004);
Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); California, CAL. PROB. CODE §
4670-8 (West 1991 & Supp. 2005); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 15-18-104 (West 1997 & Supp.
2004); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-574 (West 2003); Delaware, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
16, § 2503() (2003); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005); Georgia, GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(a)(1) (2001); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-3 (West 2004) (repealed
1999); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 39-4504(4) (Michie 1996); Illinois, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c)
(West 1992 & Supp. 2004); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-8(d) (Michie 1993); Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103 (2002); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.631 (Banks-Baldwin 2004);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.13 (West 1996 & Supp. 2005); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. §
459.025 (West 1992); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106 (2003); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-408 (Michie 1997); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.624 (Michie 2000); New
Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:14 (1996); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03
(2002); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.13, 1337.15, 1337.17, 2133.06, 2133.08 (Anderson 2002
& Supp. 2003); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101.4, 3101.8 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005);
Pennsylvania, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5414 (West Supp. 2004); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §
23-4.11-6 (1996); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-504 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 2004);
South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10 (Michie 1994); Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 166.049 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2004); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109 (1993);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1)(d) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); Wisconsin, WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-102(b) (Michie
2003). See generally, Amy Lynn Jerdee, Note, Breaking Through the Silence: Minnesota "s Pregnancy
Presumption and the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 971 (2000) (discussing
refusal of medical treatment by pregnant women).
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pregnant woman and the interests of the state in protecting potential life (or, even
further, the interests of a fetus), the requirements represented in each of the statutes
differ from one state to another. Nevertheless, they can be roughly divided into the
following six categories:
1. Total Disregard ofAn Advance Directive During the Entire Pregnancy.
This category is the most frequent, appearing in 17 states.18 Statutes under
this category declare that an advance directive of a person who becomes pregnant
has no effect during pregnancy.
2. Possibility, Probability, or Medical Certainty that the Fetus Will Develop
to Live Birth.
Some states have legislation that does not give effect to an advance
directive if it is probable,' 9 possible,20 or supported by medical certainty2' that the
fetus will develop to live birth.
18. Alabama, ALA. CODE § 22-8A (1997 & Supp. 2004); California, CAL. PROB. CODE § 4670-8
(West 1991 & Supp. 2005); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-574 (West 2003); Hawaii,
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-3 (West 2004) (repealed 1999); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 39-4504(4)
(Michie 1996); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-8(d) (Michie 1993); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §
65-28,103(a) (2002); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (West 1992); New Hampshire, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 137-H:14 (1996); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06(B) (Anderson 2002);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §3101.4, 3101.8 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005); South Carolina, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-77-70 (Law Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 2004); Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 166.049 (Vernon 2001& Supp. 2004-05); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109 (1993); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §70.122.030(1)(d) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. §
154.03 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-102(b) (Michie 2003). It is
interesting to note here that Oregon law lists abortion as one of the limitations for which the durable
power of attorney is not authorized to consent. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.540 (2003).
19. ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040 (Michie 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.16, § 25036) (2003); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-9-106(6) (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-408(3) (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
449.624(4) (Michie 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.11-6(c) (1996). This language can also be found in
theUniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act , which reads: "Life sustaining treatment must not be
withheld or withdrawn pursuant to a declaration from an individual known to the attending physician to
be pregnant so long as it is probable that the fetus will develop to the point of live birth with continued
application of life-sustaining treatment." NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
Uniform Rights of the Terminally II Act § 6(c), (1989), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
fnact99/1980s/urtia89.pdf (last visited May 18, 2005).
20. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-
206(c) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 2004);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.13(3) (West 1998 & Supp. 2005).
21. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311-629(4) (Banks-Baldwin 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-
07(3) (2002).
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3. Viability of the Fetus.
Two states mention the viability criterion as a limit on the effect of the
advance directive. Colorado requires fetal viability before voiding an advance care
directive 22 Georgia requires that the fetus be non-viable for the discontinuation of
medical treatment.23
4. Physical Harm or Pain to the Pregnant Woman.
In addition to the requirement of reasonable medical certainty that the fetus
will develop to live birth, Pennsylvania and South Dakota require the assurance
that physical harm or pain to the woman can be alleviated. 4
5. Rebuttable Presumption of Continuation of Treatment.
The Minnesota advance directive law offers a unique approach. In 1998,
the Minnesota legislature fundamentally revised their existing advance directive
25law. Prior to 1998, Minnesota's pregnancy provision provided that:
In the case of a living will of a patient that the attending physician
knows is pregnant, the living will must not be given effect as long as it
is possible that the fetus could develop to the point of live birth with
continued application of life-sustaining treatment.26
With the 1998 amendment, the current pregnancy provision states that:
When a patient lacks decision-making capacity and is pregnant, and in
reasonable medical judgment there is real possibility that if health care
to sustain her life and the life of the fetus is provided the fetus could
survive to the point of live birth, the health care provider shall presume
that the patient would have wanted such health care to be provided,
even if the withholding or withdrawal of such health care would be
authorized were she not pregnant. This presumption is negated by
health care directive provisions . . . or . . . in the absence of such
provisions, by clear and convincing evidence that the patient's wishes,
while competent, were to the contrary.
2 7
22. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §15-18-104 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004).
23. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8 (2001).
24. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5414 (West 1975 & Supp. 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10
(Michie 1994).
25. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145C (West 1998 & Supp. 2004).
26. Id. § 145B.13(3).
27. Id. § 145C.10(g) (emphasis added). For a general discussion on the new law in Minnesota see
Barbara J. Blumer, Minnesota's New Health Care Directive, 81 MINN. MED. 1 (1998) (emphasis
added), http://www.mnmed.org/publications/MnMed1998/September/blumer.cfm (last visited May 18,
2005).
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Hence, the new approach acknowledges the interest of the state in potential
fetal life, while still preserving the pregnant patient's right to withdraw treatment.
It also encourages health professionals to discuss the issue with women who are or
could become pregnant. This view goes beyond simply making the living will
void with pregnancy. It attempts to balance the woman's rights with those of the
state interest in protecting the life of the fetus.
6. Probability that the Fetus Would Not Be Born Alive.
In Ohio, life-sustaining treatment can be withheld or withdrawn, if "the
declarant's attending physician and one other physician who has examined the
declarant determine, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and in accordance
with reasonable medical standards, that the fetus would not be born alive." 28
The various legislative forms of restricting the woman's right to control her
care on the basis that she is pregnant are troubling. Not only are women deprived
of their right to determine their own treatment when incompetent, in some states
this deprivation occurs regardless of the stage of the incompetent woman's
pregnancy and heedless of whether the fetus is viable. This seems illogical: if the
woman were competent, she could abort her child without hesitation, at least
during her first trimester. But if she becomes incompetent during the first
trimester, she cannot ask to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, and is thus
compelled to save her pre-viable fetus's life.
2. Constitutionality of Pregnancy Clauses
More disturbing than the fact that pregnancy clauses exist is the fact that
they were not found to be unconstitutional under United States jurisprudence.
While the issue of constitutionality of pregnancy clauses has been raised in three
judicial opinions, none of these cases involved substantial debate over the
constitutional questions pregnancy clauses raise, nor about the serious implications
they have on women in general.
In University Health Services v. Piazzi, the Supreme Court of Georgia
implied that it would follow the pregnancy clause of Georgia, notwithstanding the
objections of the patient's family. 29 The court granted a hospital petition to
continue life-support procedures on a brain-dead pregnant woman, contrary to the
request of the patient's husband and family. The woman's wishes were unknown,
and there was no living will. The court held that, according to the law of Georgia,
28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06(B) (Anderson 2002).
29. Molly C. Dyke, Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes,
70 B.U. L. REV. 867, 871 (citing Univ. Health Servs., Inc. v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Ga. Super.
Ct. Aug. 4, 1986)).
[VOL. 8:2:331
Do PREGNANT WOMEN HAVE (LIVING) WILL?
the woman was dead and therefore had no protectable privacy interest. In addition,
the court ruled that because the pregnancy clause of the Georgia legislation
determined that the living will would be ineffective during pregnancy, the
woman's wishes regarding the living will were irrelevant. The Piazzi ruling has
led commentators to assume that the court's reliance upon the living will statute
indicates that it might reject the claim that the pregnancy clause is
unconstitutional. 30  The court, nevertheless, did not state that it was
unconstitutional.3'
Donna Piazzi did not leave any directive. Still, the court based its ruling on
the Georgia pregnancy clause. Perhaps the reason that the court relied on the
pregnancy clause is that the woman was dead under Georgia law. It is not clear
whether the court would have mentioned the pregnancy clause, let alone indirectly
validated its constitutional content, had she been legally alive. But if Donna did
not have any interests at all - a proposition for which the court did not provide any
authority - what additional weight did mentioning the pregnancy clause have in the
overall ruling? It seems to be none.
Another case in which the constitutionality of pregnancy clauses has been
raised is DiNino v. State ex. rel. Gorton.32 In DiNino, the plaintiff executed a
living will, adding a sentence declaring that the directive was the final expression
of her "legal right to consent to termination of any pregnancy," and that contrary to
the Washington Natural Death Act, it would "still have full force and effect during
the course of [her] pregnancy". 33 DiNino and her physician, who feared including
her directive in her medical file, sought a judgment declaring that her directive was
valid, and that no physician would be liable for obeying it. DiNino argued that her
constitutional right to privacy was infringed under the Act in two respects. First,
the provision directly inhibited her right to choose to have an abortion and second,
it directly infringed upon her right to choose to forego medical treatment.34
The Superior Court of King County, Washington, granted DiNino partial
summary judgment, declaring the pregnancy provision of the Natural Death Act
unconstitutional because, as drafted, the subsection inhibited a woman's right to
exercise control over her reproductive decisions; therefore, the provision violated
DiNino's fundamental right of privacy. The Superior Court, however, denied the
declaration of validity of a woman's directive because this directive attempted to
exercise full control over DiNino's reproductive decisions beyond the point where
30. Id. at 871.
31. Id.
32. 684 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Wash. 1984).
33. Id.
34. It is interesting to note that the state conceded that an individual could draft an advance
directive that contains a properly worded abortion provision, or alternatively, delete the pregnancy
provision of the model directive. Id. at 1300.
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the State has a legitimate interest in such decisions. Hence, both DiNino and the
state appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington.
On appeal, Justice Brachtenbach, writing for the majority, held that the
controversy was not "justiciable" under the meaning of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act, under which DiNino and her physician brought the suit against the
state of Washington. Because the plaintiff was neither pregnant nor terminally ill,
her arguments concerning the unconstitutionality of the Natural Death Act
pregnancy provision were "purely hypothetical and speculative." The only issue in
controversy was whether Ms. DiNino could draft a declaration that differed in its
terms from that provided in the Natural Death Act. Since the state was willing to
concede that the form could differ or be absent from the pregnancy provision, a
fact which undermines the state's objective in enacting the pregnancy provision in
the first place, the court concluded that "in the abstract, the NDA itself does not
directly infringe any constitutional rights as claimed by the respondents. 35
Although the court admitted that the constitutional rights allegedly infringed
upon are important, it did not find the case to be one of "broad overriding public
import." Hence, the court did not think an advisory opinion on the
constitutionality of the Washington living will provision would be "beneficial to
the public or to other branches of government." However, despite the fact that the
court refused to express any opinion regarding the validity of DiNino's directive
and the constitutionality of the Washington pregnancy provision, it implied that in
a real controversy, DiNino's advance directive would have been effective. The
court said:
We express no opinion as to the validity of DiNino's directive as
drafted, for this must await a factual controversy. However, under the
facts presented, the respondents, as well as this court, can only speculate
as to the possible impact of the NDA on an individual who is pregnant
and is in a terminal condition.
3 6
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Dimmik explained why it is logically wrong
to hold, as the majority did, that there is no justiciability at the time a woman drafts
a directive under the Natural Death Act. In his words:
By the majority's reasoning, a woman must be pregnant and terminally
ill before the issue is ripe for determination. Whatever the impact of the
[Natural Death Act] in that circumstance, the woman whose directive
will then be 'justiciable' will never benefit from a ruling on the matter.
In fact, the case would run a very real danger of being declared moot
before a judicial decision could be made. And if, in its discretion, the
court chooses to address the issues on mooted facts, would that
35. Id. at 1300 (emphasis added).
36. Id.
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determination be based on any less speculation than a determination
under the circumstances now before US?
37
Justice Dimmik's hypothesis was realized six years later when the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in one of the leading decisions in the United
States, acknowledged the right of a pregnant woman to refuse a cesarean section
that was needed to save the life of her twenty-three-week-old fetus.38 The woman
could not benefit from the court's decision because she (and her fetus) died two
days after the forced medical treatment. As a result of this outcome, one has to
seriously ask whether moot cases are an appropriate forum in which courts should
decide these life-and-death issues.
Yet, courts continue to hold off on determining the constitutionality of these
pregnancy provisions. In Gabrynowicz v. Heitkamp,39 the plaintiffs challenged the
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act of North Dakota that invalidated an
advance directive at pregnancy. 40 The plaintiffs were husband and wife. The
woman sought to execute a living will and durable power of attorney (for her
husband) with the hope that it would have the same effect whether she was
pregnant or not. The plaintiffs argued that North Dakota's pregnancy clauses are
unconstitutional because they: 1) impose undue burdens on the right to terminate
pregnancy and make medical decisions under the First, Fourth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments; 2) deprive women of liberty (bodily integrity) without
due process, violating the Fourteenth Amendment; 3) discriminate on the basis of
gender, violating the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment; 4)
require an expression of adherence to the state's policy of protecting fetal life,
violating the right to make and decline to make an expression of belief under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments; and, 5) violate the right to free exercise of
religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
However, like the majority opinion in DiNino, the U.S. District Court for the
District of North Dakota chose not to discuss the constitutional questions and
dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for the technical reasons of standing and ripeness.
The court held that at the time of the claim, Ms. Gabrynovicz was neither pregnant
nor incompetent. Hence, the court did not see any "realistic danger" that the
statute in question would directly injure the plaintiffs. The court acknowledged
that section 23-06.4-07(3) of the statute authorizes medical treatment of a pregnant
37. Id. at 1301.
38. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C. 1990).
39. 904 F. Supp. 1061, 1062-63 (D. N.D. 1995).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-07(3) (2002). The statute provides: "Notwithstanding a
declaration executed under this chapter, medical treatment must be provided to a pregnant patient with a
terminal condition unless ... such medical treatment will not maintain the patient in such a way as to
permit the continuing development and live birth of the unborn child or will be physically harmful or
unreasonably painful to the patient or will prolong severe pain that cannot be alleviated by medication."
Id.
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patient without distinguishing on the basis of fetal viability, and so admitted that at
least some of the rights alleged by Ms. Gabrynowicz could be implicated.
Nevertheless, the court still considered these questions to be abstract and non-
justiciable.4'
Indeed, at the time of the trial, Ms. Gabrynowicz had not issued an advance
directive and in that sense her case was less ripe than DiNino's. However, both
women were fertile: they were ready to become pregnant and fully aware of the
consequences of their proposed (present or future) directives. It is unclear why the
courts avoided substantial discussion of their directives under the premise that the
issues were not yet ready for review. Is a state of loss of competency in which the
woman's wishes cannot be directly examined, a better model than a state of full
competency to use in evaluating her constitutional rights? Alternatively, did
DiNino or Gabrynowicz have to actually become pregnant to have their claims
heard? What if the validity of their advance directives is an important factor in
their decision of whether to conceive? Can the courts avoid these women's basic
rights as competent healthy persons to make choices concerning their health, body,
and reproduction?
Importantly, in DiNino, the court stated that Ms. DiNino or her physician had
to make a better effort to look for another physician who would be willing to place
the directive in her file. The court thus concluded that the real controversy was
between DiNino and her physician. But is the question before the court really
about who gets to file the directive? Does DiNino's physician have a duty to look
for another physician who will agree to file her directive? Will the latter be
immune from any possible liability? These questions show that the courts' rulings
on these matters may create, rather than resolve, inconsistencies in the law.
C. UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND
Advanced directives are valid under English law provided they are made
freely, without undue influence. It is also necessary for the person who issued an
advance directive to be competent and informed about the directive's legal
consequences. If a pregnant woman temporarily loses capacity, an advance
directive would be effective only if it specifically addressed the possibility of
pregnancy. In case of doubt, some scholars have argued that a directive refusing
all of the recommended forms of medical treatment is unlikely to be respected,
because the courts may assume that "the woman had not addressed her mind to the
circumstances which have arisen. ' ' 2 This also seems to be the case in Ireland.
Due to the well-recognized constitutional rights of the unborn, scholars have
41. Gabrynowicz, 904 F. Supp. at 1064.
42. Nicola S. Peart et al., Maintaining a Pregnancy Following Loss of Capacity, 8 MED. L. REV.
275, 279 (2000).
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recognized that courts in Ireland will tend to ignore any advance directive issued
and will protect the life of the unborn child, "unless there existed a grave, real and
substantial risk to the life of the [incompetent] mother. 4 3
However, this claim is not supported in legislation, nor in English case law.
Moreover, in its "Report on Mental Incapacity," the English Law Commission
disagreed with the United States' approach of suspending the effectiveness of
living wills during pregnancies." The Commission recommended that women of
childbearing capacity should address the possibility of a pregnancy when executing
advance directives. In section 5.25 of the report, the Law Commission said:
We do not . . . accept that a woman's right to determine the sorts of
bodily interference which she will tolerate somehow evaporates as soon
as she becomes pregnant. There can, on the other hand, be no objection
to acknowledging that many women do in fact alter their views as to the
interventions they find acceptable as a direct result of the fact that they
are carrying a child.45
The Law Commission view is in accordance with ethical guidelines on this
matter. In a supplement to its previous report, the Royal College of Obstetrics and
Gynecologists stated that if an incompetent pregnant woman, who was fully
informed, refused treatment during pregnancy in advance, her wishes should be
respected even at the expense of the fetus.46 However, if the woman referred in her
advance directive to some forms of treatment but had no opportunity to discuss
treatment during pregnancy, and if pregnancy is not mentioned in the directive,
"the directive could be declared invalid because the circumstances at the critical
time of decision were not clearly envisaged when the directive was made".47
Hence, although academic writing in the United Kingdom and Ireland may
support the view that a woman's advance directive should be invalidated during
pregnancy, such an approach is contradictory to ethical guidelines concerning a
pregnant woman's right to determine the fate of her care, and to the Law
Commission's 1995 report on mental incapacity that explicitly discussed this issue.
43. Asim A. Sheikh & Denis A. Cusack, Maternal Brain Death, Pregnancy and the Foetus: The
Medico-Legal Implications, 7 MEDICO-LEGAL J. IR. 75, 83 (2001).
44. LAW COMMISSION, MENTAL INCAPACITY, 1995, Cm. 23 1, § 5.25.
45. Id.
46. ROYAL COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS, COURT-AUTHORISED
OBSTETRIC INTERVENTION: A CONSIDERATION OF THE LAW AND ETHICS, §§ 3.4.2, 4.2, (1996)
http://www.rcog.org.uk/print.aspPagelD=109&Type=guidelines&GuidelinelD=33 (last visited May
18, 2005).
47. Id. § 3.4.2.
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CONCLUSION
A woman's decision to issue an advance directive and to have it effectuated
implicates her fundamental right to make decisions regarding procreation, family
relationships and bodily integrity. These are the most intimate and personal
choices a person makes in a lifetime. They are central to personal dignity and
autonomy and to the "life and liberty" interests that are protected under the
Canadian Constitution.
Pregnancy clauses that exist under American law should not be a model for
Canadian law. Not only do they infringe on a woman's right to refuse medical
treatment just because she is pregnant, and hence distinguish them from non-
pregnant women on the basis of their pregnancy, but they also discriminate toward
them on a gender basis and on the basis of their incompetency. In addition,
Pregnancy clauses trivialize the significance of the mother's self-defining and
conscientious choice by automatically overriding it. They ignore the pregnant
woman's family, pretending to protect potential life without even drawing the line
at the viability of the fetus. Finally, they control the woman's body, devalue it, and
bring it near a state of involuntary servitude.48 The woman's wishes are
automatically ignored simply because she is pregnant.
However, it is not enough to conclude that Canada should not follow the
American model of pregnancy clauses. A more active step should be taken, similar
to that in the United Kingdom, so that the American model should be publicly
discussed and rejected. No doubt should be left in such a significant area. It is
hoped that this Article initiates the debate on this central issue and helps future
pregnant women and their loving families and friends better handle these difficult
circumstances of incompetency.
48. Timothy J. Burch, Incubator or Individual?: The Legal and Policy Deficiencies of Pregnancy
Clauses in Living Will and Advance Health Care Directive Statutes, 54 MD. L. REV. 528, 555 (1995).
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